bug#44187: Channel clones lack SWH fallback

[Ludovic Courtès]

Hi,

zimoun <zimon.toutoune@gmail.com> skribis:

> On Sat, 18 Sept 2021 at 23:10, Ludovic Courtès <ludo@gnu.org> wrote:

[...]

>> > How a chosen-prefix attack could work here?  I understand why the second
>> > preimage attack is an issue.  But I miss how the SHA-1 chosen-prefix attack
>> > could be exploited here to compromise the user, because this hash is 
>> > provided
>> > by this very same user.
>>
>> I think you’re right, it’s rather second-preimage attacks that would be
>> a serious problem.  My point is: as time passes, assuming that a SHA1
>> resolves to a single revision on SWH is becoming more and more
>> questionable.
>
> Well, SHA-1 is 2^160 (~10^48.2) and compared to 10^50 which is the
> estimated number of atoms in Earth.  Speaking about
> content-addressability, SHA-1 seems fine.  However, for security, yeah
> time flies. :-)

True!

>> >>   swh: Support downloads of bare Git repositories.
>> >>   git: 'update-cached-checkout' can fall back to SWH when cloning.
>> >>   git: 'reference-available?' recognizes 'tag-or-commit'.
>>
>> I’ve pushed this after adding the warning as you suggested:
>>
>>   dce2cf311b * git: 'reference-available?' recognizes 'tag-or-commit'.
>>   05f44c2d85 * git: 'update-cached-checkout' can fall back to SWH when 
>> cloning.
>>   6ec81c31c0 * swh: Support downloads of bare Git repositories.
>
> Cool!  I would deserve a --news entry. ;-)

That’s a good idea, I’ve added one.

Thanks,
Ludo’.