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Re: Niches for the Hurd: evaluation method; was: DRM musings, capabiliti

From: Michal Suchanek
Subject: Re: Niches for the Hurd: evaluation method; was: DRM musings, capabilities and stuff
Date: Tue, 30 Dec 2008 17:23:58 +0100

On 30/12/2008, Arne Babenhauserheide <arne_bab@web.de> wrote:
> Am Dienstag 30 Dezember 2008 16:55:33 schrieb Michal Suchanek:
> > You can make the driver return any data you want. However, if the data
>  > it returns are checksums signed by the cryptography hardware vendor
>  > key then they are the real checksums of the bios, boot loader, and the
>  > system including the driver (unless there is a bug somewhere, of
>  > course).
> I just repeat the data they want, sinIce  have access to all keys necessary to
>  make my GPLv3 programs work the same way when I modify it.
>  Sure, they can devise schemes all to circumvent this - and every scheme will
>  make it illegal for them to use GPLv3 software.
>  > > Malfunctioning as soon as an irrelevant bit in the system changes can be
>  > >  blamed on the system, if the application gets the information that the
>  > > bit changd from the system.
>  >
>  > The system does not really tell, it only relays data from some hardware
>  > device.
> Or changes it - see above.

Yes, and then the application does not get the right keys to decrypt
the data from the device. So the ability to lie (or be root) is
irrelevant in this case given the protocol to obtain the keys is
designed properly.



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