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Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el
From: |
Ted Zlatanov |
Subject: |
Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el |
Date: |
Mon, 02 May 2011 20:22:26 -0500 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.110016 (No Gnus v0.16) Emacs/24.0.50 (gnu/linux) |
On Tue, 03 May 2011 03:01:40 +0200 Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen <address@hidden>
wrote:
LMI> Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
>> If you insist on avoiding this file check, we could have a "Lisp data"
>> backend in addition to the file and Secrets backends. That would be
>> pretty trivial to implement and would mirror the existing netrc parse
>> results structurally.
LMI> I think the idea of putting this stuff in auth-source is good, but I'm
LMI> just wondering whether we could have a meaningful separation of secret
LMI> credentials (i.e., passwords and user names) and non-secret credentials
LMI> (key files to be used, in this instance).
LMI> I think putting stuff like key files into ~/.authinfo is fine. But if
LMI> the user has a ~/.authinfo.gpg file (for IMAP use, for instance), and
LMI> smtpmail wants to see whether a key file is to be used, there should be
LMI> a way for smtpmail to get at this information without typing the .gpg
LMI> password.
LMI> I don't really see how that would work in any convenient way with our
LMI> current interfaces. smtpmail really wants to say "check whether this
LMI> exists, but don't try too hard", sort of.
What's wrong with a pure data backend? It would be specified in
`auth-sources', basically an inlined netrc parse which could be
generated by an assistant.el walk-through!
Any non-secret data can be specified inline. Then we won't need any
file splitting, though the users can choose to put non-secret data in
a file just the same.
For example:
(setq auth-sources '((:source (:user tzz :keyfile "mykeyfile" :host "myhost"
:port 587))
"~/.authinfo.gpg"))
I think that's cleaner since the inlined data maps nicely to the netrc format.
Ted
- Re: Emacs RPC security, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Re: Emacs RPC security, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el (was: Emacs RPC security), Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/01
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, James Cloos, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el,
Ted Zlatanov <=
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/03
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/05/03
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Stefan Monnier, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/05/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Robert Pluim, 2011/05/31