[Top][All Lists]
[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]
Re: GPGME
From: |
Daiki Ueno |
Subject: |
Re: GPGME |
Date: |
Thu, 30 Jun 2011 03:41:52 +0900 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/23.3 (gnu/linux) |
Ted Zlatanov <address@hidden> writes:
> The standard OpenPGP format described in the 90-page RFC is extremely
> flexible and powerful (it's packet based and has more options than GNU
> ls); I think it would be a lot of work to implement it even for just a
> few symmetric ciphers.
It is not that complex - for symmetric encryption, only limited part is
used. Try:
$ gpg --list-packets aaa.txt.gpg
:symkey enc packet: version 4, cipher 3, s2k 3, hash 2
salt 071379daac57c0c1, count 65536 (96)
gpg: CAST5 encrypted data
:encrypted data packet:
length: 32
gpg: encrypted with 1 passphrase
:compressed packet: algo=1
:literal data packet:
mode b (62), created 1309372527, name="aaa.txt",
raw data: 4 bytes
gpg: WARNING: message was not integrity protected
So there is actually four packets. Also, you could drop the support of
compression.
Regards,
--
Daiki Ueno
- Re: secure plist store, (continued)
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/30
- Re: secure plist store, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/30
- Re: GPGME, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29
- Re: GPGME, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/29
- Re: GPGME, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/29
- Re: GPGME,
Daiki Ueno <=
- Re: GPGME, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/30
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/02
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Daiki Ueno, 2011/06/02
Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/03
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/05
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/09
- Re: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/09
- netrc field encryption in auth-source (was: Opportunistic STARTTLS in smtpmail.el), Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/10
- Re: netrc field encryption in auth-source, Ted Zlatanov, 2011/06/13
- Re: netrc field encryption in auth-source, Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen, 2011/06/13