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Re: bug#58774: 29.0.50; [WISH]: Let us make EWW browse WWW Org files cor


From: Max Nikulin
Subject: Re: bug#58774: 29.0.50; [WISH]: Let us make EWW browse WWW Org files correctly
Date: Thu, 27 Oct 2022 22:35:57 +0700
User-agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/102.2.2

On 27/10/2022 11:55, Jean Louis wrote:

Now is clear that main problem here is that Org advertises somewhere
to be "text" in MIME context, while it is not, it is by default
"application" and thus unsafe, see:
...
Text Media Types
https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6838#section-4.2.1

I do not see any problem or any difference what MIME type you are going to associate with Org mode. I agree with Arne that text/... type is more appropriate for a format readable as text. I do not see any contradictions with that RFC.

"Org Mode
Your life in plain text"

Chromium is able to display text/x-org internally just as text/plain and I like it as a way to preview and review file contents. I have not managed to configure Firefox to achieve the same behavior that allows to avoid an external application (certainly not Emacs at first).

We can't just speak of safety alone when we are in general
computing environment, we must also speak of usefulness.

I do not mind to have org-view-mode that saves me from execution some code unintentionally. Since most of the code was written without having in mind such feature, I expect a lot of iterations before all possibilities to run code will be plumbed. I suspect that it is possible to ruin whole protection by a small piece of elisp code. I am unaware of sandboxing in Emacs. I expect that making Org mode safe enough will require a lot of efforts by developers.

Your are pushing Org to rather hostile environment: highly automated attacks to distribute exploits, market of breached computers listening for remote commands. A running cryptominer would be rather innocent consequence, through the same backdoor you may receive an encryptor or various stuff searching for credentials and access tokens in your files.

Emacs is protected mostly by its low popularity. A lot of efforts have been invested in browser making attacks more expensive, but still attractive due to possible benefits. I do not like to increase surface for attacks. Someone may create a plugin targeting Emacs users just because it would be easy enough.

Consider converting Org files to HTML as an unpleasant tax for the sake of safety.

All I want is to access my personal read-only Org files by using WWW
and browse from one to the other by using links.

How are you going to distinguish your personal files and arbitrary files from non-trusted sources? By signing your files and maintaining list of trusted certificates?

For personal notes I would expect e.g. private instance of nextcloud file share (that is internally HTTP server), not accessing files directly through HTTP.



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