Re: [PATCH] ob-core: add org-confirm-babel-evaluate-cell custom variable

[Max Nikulin]

On 15/12/2022 19:25, Ihor Radchenko wrote:
> Max Nikulin writes:
>
> > I would consider reverting the commit causing user prompt for every
> > variable.
>
> I disagree. If anything, we can set the default value of
> `org-confirm-babel-evaluate-cell' to nil and apply this patch.
>
> Then, we can get the old behaviour back yet allowing concerned users to
> have more security.

I am leaving it up to you. Form my point of view it will be dead code 
that increases complexity with no practical outcome. Unfortunately 
setting `org-confirm-babel-evaluate-cell' to anything other than nil 
results in annoyance rather than security.

Perhaps advising `org-babel-execute-src-block' with `y-or-n-p' is a 
better treatment for my paranoia.

> This patch does not only affect src blocks. It affects all the users of
> `org-babel-read'.

Mostly it is called with INHIBIT-LISP-EVAL set to t.

> > https://list.orgmode.org/Y1uFDWOjZb85lk+3@protected.localdomain
> > Re: [BUG][Security] begin_src :var evaluated before the prompt to
> > confirm execution
>
> How is it related to the current discussion?
> The purpose of the security feature discussed here is not for web
> browsers or anything like that.

I am not going to add malicious source blocks to my private org files. 
For some code it is better to have a prompt, but generally the issue is 
not excessively important. I tend to inspect org files fetched from net 
in some other application at first (browser, less, or vim).

Accidental evaluation of code is a real danger for those who insist on 
opening links to org file directly in emacs or even propose to use org 
as a kind of browser. I raised the security issue in response to 
passionate messages demanding direct ways to work with org files from 
the web. I decided to remind the context with hope that it would help to 
reevaluate severity of the issue.

I do not have a better proposal, but I think I see movement in a wrong 
direction.