Re: Hey Terekhov: Wallace lost. Who'd guess.... ;)

[David Kastrup]

Alexander Terekhov <terekhov@web.de> writes:

> David Kastrup wrote:
> [...]
>> But RedHat does not sell its copyright, it merely licenses copies of
>
> RedHat licenses IP rights in (GPL'd) WORKS. RedHat doesn't "licenses 
> copies" (of GPL'd works).
>
>> the copyrighted material.  The "intangible intellectual property
>> assets" remain in the possession of RedHat.  
>
> You're either genuinely retarded or just purport to be.

And that just because of quoting you...

> The title to GPL'd IP (apart from stuff they regularly assign to the
> FSF) does remain in the possession of RedHat. But the case is about
> licensing.
>
> http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/0558.htm#t55
>
> ------
> 5.5      Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements
>
>       Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements are agreements of two 
> or more owners of different items of intellectual property to license 
> one another or third parties. 
>             ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ [Wallace: "... third parties ... The 
> stated purpose of the GPL license is to pool intellectual property. 
> (“[t]he distribution of the whole must be on the terms of this 
> License, whose permissions for other licensees extend to the entire 
> whole, and thus to each and every part regardless of who wrote it.”) 
> (Ex A (GPL) at 3)).]
>
> [...]
>
>       Cross-licensing and pooling arrangements can have anticompetitive 
> effects ... When cross-licensing or pooling arrangements are mechanisms 
> to accomplish naked price fixing or market division, they are subject 
> to challenge under the per se rule. See United States v. New Wrinkle, 
> Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952) (price fixing).

And when cross-licensing or pooling arrangements are not mechanisms to
accomplish naked price fixing or market division, they aren't.  There
is no naked price fixing going on, since the various Linux
contributors sell distributions at a wide variety of price tags.

> Another possible anticompetitive effect of pooling arrangements may
> occur if the arrangement deters or discourages participants from
> engaging in research and development, thus retarding innovation. For
> example, a pooling arrangement that requires members to grant
> licenses to each other for current and future technology at minimal
> cost may reduce the incentives of its members to engage in research
> and development because members of the pool have to share their
> successful research and development and each of the members can free
> ride on the accomplishments of other pool members.

But there is nothing which forces members to share their successful
research and development unless they _deliberately_ decide to use it
in the context of GPLed software.

-- 
David Kastrup, Kriemhildstr. 15, 44793 Bochum