Re: TPM support status ?

[Michal Suchanek]

2009/8/20 Michael Gorven <address@hidden>:
> On Thursday 20 August 2009 10:20:02 Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> 2009/8/20 Michael Gorven <address@hidden>:
>> > On Thursday 20 August 2009 09:59:42 Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> >> 2009/8/20 Michael Gorven <address@hidden>:
>> >> > On Thursday 20 August 2009 09:49:06 Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> >> >> 2009/8/20 Michael Gorven <address@hidden>:
>> >> >> > On Wednesday 19 August 2009 21:21:28 Michal Suchanek wrote:
>> >> >> >> Tell me one technical benefit of TPM over coreboot.
>> >> >> >
>> >> >> > Coreboot doesn't provide protected storage of secrets (e.g.
>> >> >> > harddrive decryption keys).
>> >> >>
>> >> >> TPM does not either at the time the BIOS is loaded. Remember, it's
>> >> >> the CPU what's running the BIOS, not the TPM chip.
>> >> >>
>> >> >> Only after BIOS enables TPM or coreboot enables any crypto device you
>> >> >> choose you get any secrets or keys.
>> >> >
>> >> > So? It's still protected storage. You can read a BIOS chip, but you
>> >> > can't just read the contents of a TPM chip.
>> >>
>> >> You can use decent crypto storage rather than half-broken TPM. There
>> >> is no advantage to using it.
>> >
>> > Like what?
>>
>> There is hardware for secure key storage which you can put into some
>> card slot or USB and unlike TPM you can also remove it and store
>> separately from the computer which greatly decreases the chance that
>> your data would be compromised if your computer is stolen.
>
> But that doesn't protect the machine (and crypto card) from being physically
> compromised, so it's not the same as TPM.

How does TPM protest your machine from physical access? I thought it's
a small chip somewhere on the board, not a steel case around the
machine.

Thanks

Michal