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02/02: gnu: runc: Update to 1.0.0-rc93.
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From: |
guix-commits |
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Subject: |
02/02: gnu: runc: Update to 1.0.0-rc93. |
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Date: |
Fri, 2 Apr 2021 23:34:49 -0400 (EDT) |
apteryx pushed a commit to branch master
in repository guix.
commit 86c39376cc00ed19758a2861c11f85fa5b94cda4
Author: Maxim Cournoyer <maxim.cournoyer@gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Tue Feb 23 00:03:01 2021 -0500
gnu: runc: Update to 1.0.0-rc93.
* gnu/packages/virtualization.scm (runc): Update to 1.0.0-rc93.
[source]: Remove the patches field.
[phases]{unpack}: Remove override.
{build}: Add the man target.
{check}: Make conditional based on TESTS?.
{install}: Add the install-man target.
[native-inputs]: Add go-github-com-go-md2man.
[home-page]: Update.
* gnu/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch: Delete file.
* gnu/local.mk: Un-register it.
---
gnu/local.mk | 1 -
gnu/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch | 343 --------------------------
gnu/packages/virtualization.scm | 31 +--
3 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 364 deletions(-)
diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index d5fd714..a1a08fa 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1645,7 +1645,6 @@ dist_patch_DATA =
\
%D%/packages/patches/rnp-disable-ruby-rnp-tests.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rnp-unbundle-googletest.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/ruby-sanitize-system-libxml.patch \
- %D%/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rust-1.19-mrustc.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rust-1.25-accept-more-detailed-gdb-lines.patch \
%D%/packages/patches/rust-1.45-linker-locale.patch \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch
b/gnu/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index f629fcb..0000000
--- a/gnu/packages/patches/runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,343 +0,0 @@
-Fix CVE-2019-5736:
-
-https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2019-5736
-https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2019/q1/119
-
-Patch copied from upstream source repository:
-
-https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/commit/0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b
-
-From 0a8e4117e7f715d5fbeef398405813ce8e88558b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
-Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
-Subject: [PATCH] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host binary
- to container
-
-There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
-pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
-have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
-writeable).
-
-We require memfd_create(2) -- though there is an O_TMPFILE fallback --
-but we can always extend this to use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or
-tmpfs. The main downside to this approach is no page-cache sharing for
-the runc binary (which overlayfs would give us) but this is far less
-complicated.
-
-This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
-Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
-ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
-worry about it).
-
-Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
-Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
----
- libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 268 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c | 11 ++
- 2 files changed, 279 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 000000000..c8a42c23f
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,268 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
-+ * Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LLC
-+ *
-+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
-+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
-+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
-+ *
-+ * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
-+ *
-+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
-+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
-+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
-+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
-+ * limitations under the License.
-+ */
-+
-+#define _GNU_SOURCE
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <stdbool.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/vfs.h>
-+#include <sys/mman.h>
-+#include <sys/sendfile.h>
-+#include <sys/syscall.h>
-+
-+/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
-+#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
-+# define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
-+#endif
-+#ifdef SYS_memfd_create
-+# define HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+/* memfd_create(2) flags -- copied from <linux/memfd.h>. */
-+# ifndef MFD_CLOEXEC
-+# define MFD_CLOEXEC 0x0001U
-+# define MFD_ALLOW_SEALING 0x0002U
-+# endif
-+int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
-+{
-+ return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
-+/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
-+#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
-+# define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
-+# define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
-+# define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
-+#endif
-+#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
-+# define F_SEAL_SEAL 0x0001 /* prevent further seals from being set
*/
-+# define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002 /* prevent file from shrinking */
-+# define F_SEAL_GROW 0x0004 /* prevent file from growing */
-+# define F_SEAL_WRITE 0x0008 /* prevent writes */
-+#endif
-+
-+#define RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+# define RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
-+# define RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS \
-+ (F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
-+#endif
-+
-+static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
-+{
-+ void *old = ptr;
-+ do {
-+ ptr = realloc(old, size);
-+ } while(!ptr);
-+ return ptr;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
-+ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or
rather
-+ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
-+ */
-+static int is_self_cloned(void)
-+{
-+ int fd, ret, is_cloned = 0;
-+
-+ fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (fd < 0)
-+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ ret = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
-+ is_cloned = (ret == RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+#else
-+ struct stat statbuf = {0};
-+ ret = fstat(fd, &statbuf);
-+ if (ret >= 0)
-+ is_cloned = (statbuf.st_nlink == 0);
-+#endif
-+ close(fd);
-+ return is_cloned;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
-+ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
-+ */
-+static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
-+{
-+ int fd;
-+ char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
-+
-+ if (!length)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (fd < 0)
-+ return NULL;
-+
-+ *length = 0;
-+ for (;;) {
-+ int n;
-+
-+ n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
-+ if (n < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ if (!n)
-+ break;
-+
-+ copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
-+ memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
-+ *length += n;
-+ }
-+ close(fd);
-+ return copy;
-+
-+error:
-+ close(fd);
-+ free(copy);
-+ return NULL;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
-+ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each
entry
-+ * to the array of pointers.
-+ */
-+static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
-+{
-+ int num = 0;
-+ char *cur = data;
-+
-+ if (!data || *output != NULL)
-+ return -1;
-+
-+ while (cur < data + data_length) {
-+ num++;
-+ *output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
-+ (*output)[num - 1] = cur;
-+ cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
-+ }
-+ (*output)[num] = NULL;
-+ return num;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
-+ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
-+ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
-+ */
-+static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
-+{
-+ char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
-+ size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
-+
-+ cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
-+ if (!cmdline)
-+ goto error;
-+ environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
-+ if (!environ)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ return 0;
-+
-+error:
-+ free(environ);
-+ free(cmdline);
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+}
-+
-+static int clone_binary(void)
-+{
-+ int binfd, memfd;
-+ ssize_t sent = 0;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ memfd = memfd_create(RUNC_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC |
MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
-+#else
-+ memfd = open("/tmp", O_TMPFILE | O_EXCL | O_RDWR | O_CLOEXEC, 0711);
-+#endif
-+ if (memfd < 0)
-+ return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
-+
-+ binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ if (binfd < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, RUNC_SENDFILE_MAX);
-+ close(binfd);
-+ if (sent < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+#ifdef HAVE_MEMFD_CREATE
-+ int err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, RUNC_MEMFD_SEALS);
-+ if (err < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+#else
-+ /* Need to re-open "memfd" as read-only to avoid execve(2) giving
-EXTBUSY. */
-+ int newfd;
-+ char *fdpath = NULL;
-+
-+ if (asprintf(&fdpath, "/proc/self/fd/%d", memfd) < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+ newfd = open(fdpath, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
-+ free(fdpath);
-+ if (newfd < 0)
-+ goto error;
-+
-+ close(memfd);
-+ memfd = newfd;
-+#endif
-+ return memfd;
-+
-+error:
-+ close(memfd);
-+ return -EIO;
-+}
-+
-+int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
-+{
-+ int execfd;
-+ char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
-+
-+ /* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
-+ int cloned = is_self_cloned();
-+ if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
-+ return cloned;
-+
-+ if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
-+ return -EINVAL;
-+
-+ execfd = clone_binary();
-+ if (execfd < 0)
-+ return -EIO;
-+
-+ fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
-+ return -ENOEXEC;
-+}
-diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-index 28269dfc0..7750af35e 100644
---- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-+++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
-@@ -534,6 +534,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
- free(namespaces);
- }
-
-+/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
-+extern int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
-+
- void nsexec(void)
- {
- int pipenum;
-@@ -549,6 +552,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
- if (pipenum == -1)
- return;
-
-+ /*
-+ * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is
necessary
-+ * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
-+ * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
-+ */
-+ if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
-+ bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
-+
- /* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
- nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
-
diff --git a/gnu/packages/virtualization.scm b/gnu/packages/virtualization.scm
index c6929b9..b365d72 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/virtualization.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/virtualization.scm
@@ -1564,17 +1564,16 @@ monitor/GPU.")
(define-public runc
(package
(name "runc")
- (version "1.0.0-rc6")
+ (version "1.0.0-rc93")
(source (origin
(method url-fetch)
(uri (string-append
"https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/releases/";
"download/v" version "/runc.tar.xz"))
(file-name (string-append name "-" version ".tar.xz"))
- (patches (search-patches "runc-CVE-2019-5736.patch"))
(sha256
(base32
- "1c7832dq70slkjh8qp2civ1wxhhdd2hrx84pq7db1mmqc9fdr3cc"))))
+ "0b90r1bkvlqli53ca1yc1l488dba0isd3i6l7nlhszxi8p7hzvkh"))))
(build-system go-build-system)
(arguments
'(#:import-path "github.com/opencontainers/runc"
@@ -1584,35 +1583,27 @@ monitor/GPU.")
#:tests? #f
#:phases
(modify-phases %standard-phases
- (replace 'unpack
- (lambda* (#:key source import-path #:allow-other-keys)
- ;; Unpack the tarball into 'runc' instead of 'runc-1.0.0-rc5'.
- (let ((dest (string-append "src/" import-path)))
- (mkdir-p dest)
- (invoke "tar" "-C" (string-append "src/" import-path)
- "--strip-components=1"
- "-xvf" source))))
(replace 'build
(lambda* (#:key import-path #:allow-other-keys)
(with-directory-excursion (string-append "src/" import-path)
- ;; XXX: requires 'go-md2man'.
- ;; (invoke "make" "man")
- (invoke "make"))))
- ;; (replace 'check
- ;; (lambda _
- ;; (invoke "make" "localunittest")))
+ (invoke "make" "all" "man"))))
+ (replace 'check
+ (lambda* (#:key tests? #:allow-other-keys)
+ (when tests?
+ (invoke "make" "localunittest"))))
(replace 'install
(lambda* (#:key import-path outputs #:allow-other-keys)
(with-directory-excursion (string-append "src/" import-path)
(let ((out (assoc-ref outputs "out")))
- (invoke "make" "install" "install-bash"
+ (invoke "make" "install" "install-bash" "install-man"
(string-append "PREFIX=" out)))))))))
(native-inputs
- `(("pkg-config" ,pkg-config)))
+ `(("go-md2man" ,go-github-com-go-md2man)
+ ("pkg-config" ,pkg-config)))
(inputs
`(("libseccomp" ,libseccomp)))
(synopsis "Open container initiative runtime")
- (home-page "https://www.opencontainers.org/";)
+ (home-page "https://opencontainers.org/";)
(description
"@command{runc} is a command line client for running applications
packaged according to the