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Re: Capability Authentication
From: |
olafBuddenhagen |
Subject: |
Re: Capability Authentication |
Date: |
Tue, 18 Oct 2005 01:26:10 +0200 |
User-agent: |
Mutt/1.5.9i |
Hi,
> If you look at my protocols, this imposes an additional IPCs and
> system calls in the RPC path for every capability that should be
> copied from one process to another. As capability copy is expected to
> be ubiquituous, this is a discouraging result.
Is it really? My Guess would be that in typical use, capability passing
of any kind should happen seldom enough not to make a few more
IPCs/syscalls critical... But well, I guess I'm overlooking something
:-)
-antrik-
Re: The Perils of Pluggability (was: capability authentication), Alfred M. Szmidt, 2005/10/10
Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Völp, 2005/10/13
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Brinkmann, 2005/10/14
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Völp, 2005/10/17
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Brinkmann, 2005/10/17
- Re: Capability Authentication,
olafBuddenhagen <=
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Brinkmann, 2005/10/18
- Re: Capability Authentication, olafBuddenhagen, 2005/10/20
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Brinkmann, 2005/10/20
- Re: Capability Authentication, Jonathan S. Shapiro, 2005/10/21
- Re: Capability Authentication, Marcus Brinkmann, 2005/10/25
- Re: Capability Authentication, Jonathan S. Shapiro, 2005/10/25