Re: [Sks-devel] 32-bit (short ID) collisions: New milestone(?) reached

[Kristian Fiskerstrand]

On 06/04/2016 12:43 AM, Gunnar Wolf wrote:
> There are several tools relying on this (now very) weak 32-bit scheme;
> the first such tool we found was precisely the «PGP pathfinder & key
> statistics» service, which fails badly: Even specifying the full
> fingerprints, I do get three (absolutely fake!) trust path into the
> impostor:

I'd like to take a bit of time to comment on this. The web of trust in
the abstract is all nice, but ultimately services such as the pathfinder
is only a tool to guide in how you can find a direct path. It is not a
replacement for actually properly configuring the trustdb and doing
(local) signatures of external keys that are to be used in the validity
calculation. So I fail to see an issue in this case, really, a simple
tool can be fooled, but the underlying model is sound.

-- 
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Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: https://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
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