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Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits
From: |
Derek Price |
Subject: |
Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits |
Date: |
Wed, 21 Sep 2005 10:06:29 -0400 |
User-agent: |
Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.6 (Windows/20050716) |
Jim Hyslop wrote:
> I've been thinking about the RCS Keyword Exploit (
> http://ximbiot.com/cvs/wiki/index.php?title=GPG-Signed_Commits_RCS_Keyword_Exploit
>
> )
>
> Unless I'm mistaken, no keywords are expanded on check-in, they are
> all expanded on check-out, correct?
True.
> How about if CVS/Base contains the revision exactly as stored in the
> RCS file (which will then allow the RCS keywords to be included in the
> signature), and the server also sends a patch that expands the
> keyword, which would be stored in a separate file, such as
> .#filename.revision.kwd. Since these files contain only the patches
> required (if any) to expand RCS keywords, the files will be fairly small.
>
> Thoughts?
This was my original design actually, before I noticed the exploit, and
this is exactly the situation that can be exploited. The point is that
the server supplies the content of that keyword file and not all of it
can be signed, so the content of your keyword info file, once
substituted into the verified file, could compromise it. Read the
scenario you linked to again.
The revision metadata could be signed by the user, but some keyword
content isn't known until checkout time, meaning that there is no one
but the server to sign it and the main point of this GPG-signed commits
exercise is avoiding a situation where a compromised server compromises
the contents of the CVS repository.
I was thinking about it too, and a combination of signed metadata (for
log messages, author, date of commit, etc.) and maybe some simple
verification that tags (for $Name$ keywords), for instance, only
contained [a-zA-Z0-9_-] should be pretty safe, but I haven't done an
exhausted analysis yet. Regardless, I don't think I want to do it in
the first pass. It isn't necessary and the complexity of secure keyword
expansion costs more than the feature is worth, to my mind.
Regards,
Derek
--
Derek R. Price
CVS Solutions Architect
Ximbiot <http://ximbiot.com>
v: +1 717.579.6168
f: +1 717.234.3125
<mailto:derek@ximbiot.com>
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, (continued)
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/23
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Mark D. Baushke, 2005/09/23
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Derek Price, 2005/09/23
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/24
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Derek Price, 2005/09/24
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Mark D. Baushke, 2005/09/24
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/21
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits,
Derek Price <=
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/21
- Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Derek Price, 2005/09/21
- Re: GPG-Signed Commits and RCS Keyword exploit [long], Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/22
- Re: GPG-Signed Commits and RCS Keyword exploit [long], Derek Price, 2005/09/22
Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Derek Price, 2005/09/09
Re: [task #4633] GPG-Signed Commits, Jim Hyslop, 2005/09/10