Re: Hey Terekhov: Wallace lost. Who'd guess.... ;)

[Alexander Terekhov]

Alexander Terekhov wrote:
[...]
> III. Analysis
> 
> Wallace alleges that the Defendants’ “predatory price-fixing scheme
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

> prevents [him] from marketing his own computer operating system as a
> competitor.” His complaint fails because it fails to allege
> anticompetitive effects in an identifiable market. Car Carriers, Inc.
> v. Ford Motor Company, 745 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming dismissal
> based on failure to allege an anticompetitive effect).
> 
> Antitrust laws are for “the protection of competition, not competitors.”
> Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-o-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977). In
> this case, the GPL benefits consumers by allowing for the distribution of
> software at no cost, other than the cost of the media on which the
> software is distributed. (Ex. A at ¶ 1). “When the plaintiff is a poor
> champion of consumers, a court must be especially careful not to grant
> relief that may undercut the proper functions of antitrust.” Ball Mem’l
> Hosp., Inc. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir.
> 1986). Because he has not identified an anticompetitive effect, Wallace
> has failed to allege a cognizable antitrust injury.

http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/cgi-bin/getcase.pl?court=us&vol=495&invol=328

"Although a vertical, maximum-price-fixing agreement is unlawful under 1 
of the Sherman Act, it does not cause a competitor antitrust injury unless 
it results in predatory pricing. 8 Antitrust injury does not arise for 
purposes of 4 of the Clayton Act, see n. 1, supra, until a private party 
is adversely affected by an anticompetitive aspect of the defendant's 
conduct, see Brunswick, 429 U.S., at 487 ; in the context of pricing 
practices, only predatory pricing has the requisite anticompetitive 
effect. 9 See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related [495 U.S. 
328, 340] Practices Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 
697, 697-699 (1975); McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J. Law & Econ. 
289, 292-294 (1980). Low prices benefit consumers regardless of how those 
prices are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not 
threaten competition."

Go figure.

regards,
alexander.