Re: IBM's interpretation of the GNU GPL contract

[rjack]

Alexander Terekhov wrote:
> http://www.groklaw.net/pdf/IBM-881.pdf (and Linux derivative^Wderived 
> work as whole.)
>
> He he.
>
> I like footnote 9 about New York law on preambles and other pefatory
> language in a contract aiding its interpretation. :-)
>
> regards,
> alexander.


IBM submits on p23:

"Section 2 grants a licensee such as SCO the right to create and 
distribute derivative works . . . –-- provided that the derived work
“as a whole” (which in this case included the Linux Kernel) must be
licensed as a whole at no charge to all third parties under the terms of 
this License.(Ex. 128 § 2(b) . . .)"


In other words one of the *original* license (contract) terms is to 
*again* license (contract) with “all third parties” under the terms of 
the GPL license (contract).

This is a contract between SCO and IBM agreeing to again license the 
created derivative work among SCO, IBM and “all third parties” (who 
choose to accept the GPL offer).

Unfortunately (for the GPL) one “essential term” of any contract is the 
specific identity of the contracting parties. “All third parties” 
describes a potentially infinite number of unagreed upon parties.

Any accepting “third party” must also agree to license his [as yet] 
unagreed upon “modifications” (which serves as an “essential term” of 
consideration from the potential offeree).

So now we have an original contractual obligation to form a second 
contract with unspecified parties for an unspecified consideration.

"—[A] contract to make a contract is enforceable only where all material 
terms have been agreed upon. 1 Corbin, Contracts, § 2.8, at 131, 133-34 
(Perillo ed. 1993)." Prisma Zona Exploratoria de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. 
Calderón, 310 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).

"Under Michigan law, "[t]o be enforceable, a contract to enter into
a future contract must specify all its material and essential terms and
leave none to be agreed upon as the result of future negotiations."
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., Inc. v. Waldo, 286 N.W. 630, 632 (Mich. 1939)”

 "‘If the document or contract that the parties agree to make is to 
contain any material term that is not already agreed on, no contract has 
yet been made; and the so called "contract to make a contract" is not a 
contract at all.’" Hansen v. Catsman, 123 N.W.2d 265, 266 (Mich. 1963).

“To constitute a valid contract, the parties must assent to the same 
thing in the same sense, and their minds must meet as to all the terms. 
If any portion of the proposed terms is not settled, or no mode agreed 
on by which they may be settled, there is no agreement. Gregory v. 
Perdue, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 655, 657, 267 S.E.2d 584, 586 (1980). . . A 
"'contract to make a contract'" is not an enforceable agreement. 
Northington v. Michelotti, 121 N.C. App. 180, 184, 464 S.E.2d 711, 714 
(1995)(quoting 1 Joseph M. Perillo, Corbin on Contracts, §2.8(a)(revised 
edition 1993))." Wilkerson v. Carriage Park Development Corp., 130  NC 
App 475 (08/04/1998 97-1387)