gnu-misc-discuss
[Top][All Lists]
Advanced

[Date Prev][Date Next][Thread Prev][Thread Next][Date Index][Thread Index]

CAFC 2008-1001 -- "license to the world must be a bare license" case


From: Alexander Terekhov
Subject: CAFC 2008-1001 -- "license to the world must be a bare license" case
Date: Tue, 22 Jan 2008 11:15:28 +0100

LOL.

http://jmri.sourceforge.net/k/docket/cafc-pi-1/AppellantsBrief.pdf

-------
No. 2008-1001
United States Court of Appeals
for the
Federal Circuit
ROBERT G. JACOBSEN
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
MATTHEW KATZER AND KAMIND ASSOCIATES, INC.
Defendant-Appellee
On appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California in Case No. 06-1905,
Judge Jeffrey S. White
BRIEF OF ROBERT G. JACOBSEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
VICTORIA K. HALL
LAW OFFICE OF VICTORIA K. HALL
3 Bethesda Metro
Suite 700
Bethesda, MD 20814
(301) 280-5925
December 17, 2007 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
113
FORM 9. Certificate of Interest
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
____________________________ v. ____________________________
No. _______
CERTIFICATE OF INTEREST
Counsel for the (petitioner) (appellant) (respondent) (appellee) (amicus) (name 
of party)
_______________________ certifies the following (use “None” if applicable; use 
extra sheets
if necessary):
1. The full name of every party or amicus represented by me is:
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
2. The name of the real party in interest (if the party named in the caption is 
not the real
party in interest) represented
by me is:
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
3. All parent corporations and any publicly held companies that own 10 percent 
or more
of the stock of the party or amicus curiae represented by me are:
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
4. ? There is no such corporation as listed in paragraph 3.
5. The names of all law firms and the partners or associates that appeared for 
the party
or amicus now represented
by me in the trial court or agency or are expected to appear in this
court are:
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________________________________________________________________
_____________________ _______________________________
Date Signature of counsel
_______________________________
Printed name of counsel
Form 9
Table of Contents
I. Statement of Related Cases 
................................................................... 1
II. Jurisdictional 
Statement.........................................................................
 1
III. Statement of the Issues 
.......................................................................... 2
IV. Statement of the Case 
............................................................................ 3
V. Statement of the Facts 
........................................................................... 7
VI. Summary of Argument 
........................................................................ 13
VII. Standard of Review 
............................................................................. 15
VIII. 
Argument.............................................................................................
 15
1. Jacobsen is Likely to Succeed on the 
Merits............................................18
a. Jacobsen Has Shown Copyright 
Infringement....................................18
b. District Court Misconstrued the Law in Finding Katzer and KAMIND
had a License 
.......................................................................................19
c. Katzer and KAMIND’s License Defense 
Fails...................................24
i. Katzer and KAMIND Cannot Show They Had an Implied
Nonexclusive License from Jacobsen 
............................................28
ii. No Bilateral Contract Exists Between the Parties..........................28
iii. No Other Implied License Exists 
...................................................35
iv. No Unilateral Contract Exists 
........................................................39
v. Thus, Katzer and KAMIND Have No Implied License ................41
2. Katzer and KAMIND Have No Rights Under a Bare License ................42
a. Katzer and KAMIND Acted Outside the Scope of the Bare License
........................................................................................................43
3. Balance of Hardships Tip in Jacobsen’s Favor 
........................................44
IX. 
Conclusion...........................................................................................
 46
Addendum 1: Order Granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss; Granting in
Part and Denying in Part Defendants' Motion to Strike; and
Denying Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction
Addendum 2: Order Denying Motion for Leave to File Motion for
Reconsideration
Addendum 3: Artistic License (A370 in Joint Appendix)
i
Table of Authorities
Cases
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629 (9th Cir. 2007)
...................................................................................................................
 15
Allegro Corp. v. Only New Age Music, Inc., No. Civ-01-790-HU, 2003 WL
23571745 (D. Or. Jan. 23, 
2003)................................................................ 28
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444 (N.D. Cal.
1991) 
..............................................................................................
 19, 28, 29
Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir.
1999) 
....................................................................................................
 22, 25
Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568 (4th Cir. 
1994)................................ 34
Beard v. Goodrich, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1031 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) ................ 
27
Benda v. Grand Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers,
584 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 
1978)...................................................................... 15
City of Stockton v. Weber, 98 Cal. 433 
(1893)............................................. 29
De Forest Radio Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United States, 273 U.S. 236 (1927) .. 5, 17
Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for the State of California v. Bazaar Del Mundo
Inc., 448 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 
2006)............................................................ 14
Duke v. Langdon, 695 F.2d 1136 (9th Cir. 1983) 
......................................... 40
Earth Island Inst. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2006) 
......... 13
Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990) ............ 22, 
25, 32
Guzman v. Visalia Cmty. Bank, 71 Cal. App. 4th 1370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
...................................................................................................................
 36
Hutchins v. Zoll Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 
2007)...................... 13
In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673 (9th Cir. 1996) 
.......................................... 5, 17
Kennedy v. Nat’l Juvenile Detention Ass’n, 187 F.3d 690 (7th Cir. 1999) .. 32
LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir.
2006) 
..........................................................................................................
 15
Lowe v. Loud Records, No. Civ.A. 01-1797, 2003 WL 22799698 (E.D. Pa.
Nov. 20, 2003) 
...........................................................................................
 22
Lulirama Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872 (5th Cir. 1997)
...................................................................................................................
 32
Native Village of Quinhagak v. United States, 35 F.3d 388 (9th Cir. 1994). 39
Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co., 143 Cal. App. 4th 509 (Cal. Ct. App.
2006) 
..........................................................................................................
 35
ii
Palmer v. Schindler Elevator Corp., 108 Cal. App. 4th 154 (Cal. Ct. App.
2003) 
..........................................................................................................
 34
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007) ...... 13, 14
Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004).......... 
26
ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 
1996)............................. 26
Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1993)..................... 21, 
27, 31
Schaeffer v. Williams, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1243 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993)............. 
26
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115 (9th Cir. 1999) 14,
21, 26, 30
Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (N.D. Cal.
2000) 
..........................................................................................................
 30
Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 
2007).......................................... 13
Wall Data Inc. v. Los Angeles Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769 (9th Cir. 2006)7,
26
Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc., 227 F.3d
1110 (9th Cir. 
2000)...................................................................................
 22
Statutes
28 U.S.C. § 
1292(a)(1)....................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
1292(c)(1)....................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
1295(a)(1)....................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
1331.............................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
1338.............................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
2201.............................................................................................
 1
28 U.S.C. § 
2202.............................................................................................
 1
Cal. Civ. § 1549 
............................................................................................
 26
Cal. Civ. § 1550 
......................................................................................
 26, 27
Cal. Civ. § 1580 
............................................................................................
 27
Cal. Civ. § 1605 
............................................................................................
 26
Cal. Civ. § 1657 
............................................................................................
 26
Other Authorities
Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed. 1999) 
......................................................... 38
Brian W. Carver, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing Open
Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 Berkeley Tech. L. J. 443 (2005).. 37
Lawrence Rosen, Open Source Licensing: Software Freedom and Intellectual
Property Law (2005) 
...................................................................... 33, 37, 
38
Rest. 2d Contracts § 
45(2)............................................................................
 36
iii
iv
Rest. 2d Contracts § 32 
.................................................................................
 36
Rest. 2d Contracts § 
45(1).............................................................................
 35
Rest. 2d Contracts § 
53(3).............................................................................
 36
Rest. 2d Contracts § 59 
........................................................................... 35, 
36
Treatises
11 Williston on Contracts § 30.10 (4th ed. 1999) (Richard A. Long, ed.) .... 29
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.02[B][5] 
.................................. 34
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.03[A][7] 
.................................. 22
I. Statement of Related Cases
One appellate case, Jacobsen v. Katzer et al., Case No. 07-16651, was
erroneously opened by the Ninth Circuit, which has since closed the docket.
The Notice of Appeal, filed Sept. 13, 2007, A504, states the appeal is to the
Federal Circuit. The district court clerk erroneously sent the Notice of
Appeal to the Ninth Circuit, which docketed the case. Upon recognizing the
error, the district court clerk transmitted the Notice of Appeal to the Federal
Circuit. The Ninth Circuit then closed the docket for Case No. 07-16651.
II. Jurisdictional Statement
This case involves a declaratory judgment of non-infringement,
invalidity and unenforceability of claim 1 of U.S. Patent No. 6,530,329
(issued Mar. 11, 2003), and a copyright infringement cause of action, among
other causes of action. The district court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§
1331, 1338, 2201, and 2202.
The district court issued its order Aug. 17, 2007, and denied a motion
for leave to file a motion for reconsideration Sept. 5, 2007. Jacobsen filed
this Notice of Appeal Sept. 13, 2007. A504.
This appeal is from an order denying a motion for preliminary
injunction, which is appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). The Federal Circuit
1
has jurisdiction in the appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1) and 28 U.S.C. §
1292(c)(1).
III. Statement of the Issues
• Did the district court err in finding Katzer and KAMIND had a license
to copy, modify, and distribute Jacobsen’s copyrighted material when
Katzer and KAMIND never entered into a bilateral contract with
Jacobsen, never tendered performance for a unilateral contract, nor ever
obtained permission to use Jacobsen’s copyrighted material?
• Did the district court err in finding a license when Katzer and
KAMIND copied, modified, and distributed Jacobsen’s copyrighted
material outside the scope of Jacobsen’s license, the Artistic License?
• Did the district court misconstrue the law by broadly interpreting the
Artistic License when mandatory Ninth Circuit precedent requires
narrow interpretation of copyright licenses?
• Did the district court fail to give proper weight to Plaintiff’s other
arguments – that a condition precedent existed, that Jacobsen had
revoked any license Katzer and KAMIND had, or that Jacobsen could
rescind any contract that Katzer and KAMIND had?
2
IV. Statement of the Case
Robert Jacobsen, a high energy research physicist at Lawrence
Berkeley National Laboratory, and a professor and associate dean at UC
Berkeley, is a leader of an open source group called Java Model Railroad
Interface (JMRI). A36. JMRI programmers created model train control
systems software, which hobbyists install on their computers to control trains
on their layouts. See A114-A115. Matthew Katzer is the chief officer of
KAMIND Associates, Inc. (“KAMIND”), which sells model train control
systems software products. See A36-37. Jacobsen and Katzer became
acquainted in 2000, and have for several years been members of the National
Model Railroad Association’s Digital Command Control Working Group, a
standards-setting body within the NMRA. A43; A45. Beginning in March
2005, Katzer and KAMIND began accusing Jacobsen of infringing claim 1 of
U.S. Patent 6,530,329 (“the ‘329 patent”). A51. On a roughly monthly basis,
they sent cease and desist letters styled as bills for in excess of $200,000 to
Jacobsen’s home address. A51-A52. Later bills included interest. See id. In
October 2005, Katzer and KAMIND sent a FOIA request, including one bill,
directed to Jacobsen’s employer, Lawrence Berkeley National Lab, and the
U.S. Department of Energy. A52. The FOIA request sought emails on
3
Lawrence Berkeley Lab’s email servers that Jacobsen wrote and received that
were related to model train control systems software development. Id. These
actions formed the basis for Jacobsen’s original Complaint, filed Mar. 13,
2006, for declaratory judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and
unenforceability of claim 1 of the ‘329 patent. A15. While researching
Katzer and KAMIND’s software in connection with an unrelated motion,
Jacobsen discovered that Katzer and KAMIND were using JMRI materials in
a manner that was outside the scope of JMRI’s license, the Artistic License.1
A115; A357. Jacobsen obtained assignments from other JMRI developers,
and filed a copyright registration on the relevant JMRI version and files.
A357. On Sept. 11, 2006, he filed an Amended Complaint, which included a
cause of action for copyright infringement. A33. He sent Katzer and
KAMIND a cease and desist letter Sept. 21, 2006. A315. Katzer and
KAMIND did not respond. Jacobsen filed a motion for preliminary
injunction to enjoin Katzer and KAMIND’s copyright infringement. A26;
A104. Katzer and KAMIND countered that they had stopped all use of the
files, and existing versions would no longer work after March 2007. A332
1 The Artistic License is Addendum 3 to this brief, and A370 in the Joint
Appendix.
4
(Katzer’s stating that all nonregistered versions – but making no mention of
registered versions – “will become nonfunctional on March 21, 2006” [sic]).
Failing to cite the mandatory Ninth Circuit authority in the S.O.S. decision,
they also claimed they had a broad license and thus any cause of action could
only lay in contract, not in copyright. A323; A505-A506. Jacobsen replied
that Katzer and KAMIND had no agreement or implied license. A346-A349.
Jacobsen said Katzer had rejected the license through his performance.
A347. He said any of Katzer and KAMIND’s use was outside the scope of
the Artistic License’s grant. A345-A346. Jacobsen also raised issues of
condition precedent, revocation, rescission, and problems with contract
formation. A347-A349.
The district court heard the motion Jan. 19, 2007, and issued its order
Aug. 17, 2007, denying the motion. A8-A11; A458. While incorrectly
stating the parties agreed the disputed material was “no longer of any
commercial use”, the district court correctly rejected Katzer and KAMIND’s
arguments that voluntary cessation mooted the preliminary injunction. A9.
The district court then discussed the license and its scope.
5
Citing a bankruptcy case involving a patent license, among other
authority2, the district court found Jacobsen had waived his right to sue
because the Artistic License granted broad rights to the public to use JMRI
software. A10-A11. “[I]mplicit in a nonexclusive license is the promise not
to sue for copyright infringement. See In re CFLC, Inc., 89 F.3d 673, 677
(9th Cir. 1996), citing De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v. United States, 273
U.S. 236, 242 (1927)….” A10. The district court briefly discussed S.O.S.,
Inc v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989) and the scope of the
license grant, but did not address an important aspect of the S.O.S. decision –
that a court must construe a license narrowly to protect the rights of the
copyright holder. A10. Instead, the district court interpreted the license
broadly. A11. The district court also did not address Jacobsen’s arguments
relating to conditions, revocation, rescission, or problems with contract
formation. Jacobsen sought leave to file a motion for reconsideration Sept. 4,
2007. A498-A503. In denying the motion for leave, the district court stated
2 The district court also cited Effects Associates, Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 
(9th
Cir. 1990), a copyright infringement case in which the parties litigated the 
issue of
waiver.
6
it had considered the other arguments and found them unpersuasive. A12-13.
Jacobsen timely appealed. See A504.
V. Statement of the Facts
Robert Jacobsen is a leader of an open source software group called
Java Model Railroad Interface, or JMRI. A36. Open source projects are
typically a diverse group of software developers, often in various locations
worldwide, who collaborate to create and improve software. JMRI’s
members are in the United States, New Zealand, and Europe. A94-A102;
A353-A354 (U.S., U.K., and Switzerland authors); see A444-A445 (New
Zealand author). JMRI created an application called DecoderPro, which
allows model railroaders to use their computers to control model trains more
easily. A45-A46; A114.
Modern model trains often have decoder chips, which allow model
railroaders to control the trains’ lights, sounds and speed. A46; A118. A
wide range of decoder chips exists. A46. Some are simple to program. See
A114. Some are very complex. See id. JMRI’s DecoderPro programs
decoder chips in the trains. A46; A114. DecoderPro uses Decoder
Definition files as a basis for programming the chips. A114. These files
contain authors’ names, dates of creation and modification, and version
7
numbers. A188 (author’s name at line 7; dates of creation and modification
at lines 5 and 7; version number at lines 5, 7, and 9). They also state “see the
COPYING file for more information on licensing and appropriate use.” Id.
line 4. All files have copyright notices. E.g., A188 line 3. More than 100
Decoder Definition files exist, due to the work of JMRI developers. A39; see
A120. The files are available for download through an open source incubator
site, SourceForge. A355-A356. When users download the software, they are
not presented with a click-through agreement, a type of contract in which a
user must scroll through the terms and click “Accept” before proceeding.
A356; A372-A375; A378. E.g., Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. Co. Sheriff’s Dep’t,
447 F.3d 769, 775 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006) (describing click-through agreements).
DecoderPro and its Decoder Definition files are subject to an open
source license called the Artistic License, whose terms are listed in the
COPYING file. A355-A356; A370; see A188 line 4. The Artistic License
grants users the right to copy, modify, and distribute, provided that they copy,
modify, and distribute the software in a certain manner. A370. They may
modify JMRI software
provided that [they] insert a prominent notice in each changed file
stating how and when [they] changed that file, and provided that [they]
do at least ONE of the following:
8
a) place [their] modifications in the Public Domain or otherwise make
them Freely Available, such as by posting said modifications to Usenet
or an equivalent medium, or placing the modifications on a major
archive site such as ftp.uu.net, or by allowing the Copyright Holder to
include [their] modifications in the Standard Version of the Package.
b) use the modified Package only within [their] corporation or
organization.
c) rename any non-standard executables so the names do not conflict
with standard executables, which must also be provided, and provide a
separate manual page for each non-standard executable that clearly
documents how it differs from the Standard Version.
d) make other distribution arrangements with the Copyright Holder.
Id. Much like duration or geographic restrictions, these restrictions define the
scope of the license grant because the restrictions relate to the copyright
holder’s exclusive rights under copyright law, so that any use that is outside
these restrictions is copyright infringement. In other words, a user does not
have permission to modify JMRI files unless he modifies the files in a certain
way – inserting a prominent notice in each changed file stating how and when
he changed that file – and unless he does one of four things relating to
modification or distribution.
Several companies, including KAMIND, offer competing software
products which are used to program decoder chips in model trains. See
A367. KAMIND offers a product called Decoder Commander. A115-A116.
9
Decoder Commander has functionality similar to JMRI’s DecoderPro. Id.
As noted earlier, Matthew Katzer is the chief officer of KAMIND. A36-A37.
Beginning in late 2004, and unbeknownst to Jacobsen, Katzer and
KAMIND began downloading JMRI Decoder Definition files and converting
them to a format for use in their products, including Decoder Commander.
A122-A123; A303; A306-A309. They do not deny they copied, modified,
and distributed JMRI materials contrary to the terms of the Artistic License.
A328; A10. Katzer knew about the license, because Jacobsen told him about
it. A120-A121; A284; A286; A292-A293 (Jacobsen’s telling Katzer the
terms, per the Artistic License, for modifying JMRI software; Jacobsen’s 
reprinting
the section above relating to modifications from the Artistic
License). Katzer chose not to follow any of the terms. In converting the
files, Katzer and KAMIND stripped out authors’ names, JMRI copyright
notices, and all references to the COPYING file which stated the license
terms, and changed the file names. A116; A118. Numerous examples of
copying remained, including modification dates, typos, variable names and
settings, and the arrangement of variables and data. A117-A118; compare
A188 line 7 (Jacobsen’s DecoderPro) with A205 line 5 (Katzer’s Decoder
Commander) (same modification date); compare A195, 8th line from bottom
10
(Jacobsen’s DecoderPro) with A233 line 16 (Katzer’s Decoder Commander)
(both misspelling “output” as “outout”); compare A195, last 5 lines and A196
lines 1-18 (Jacobsen’s DecoderPro) with A233 lines 31-53 (Katzer’s Decoder
Commander) (same order, naming, and misspelling of variables). Katzer also
put out a software tool whose only use was to convert JMRI Decoder
Definition files into a format to be used with Katzer and KAMIND’s
products. A118-A120; compare A195, 8th line from bottom (Jacobsen’s
DecoderPro) with A267 line 4 (output from Katzer’s software tool) (both
misspelling “output” as “outout”); compare A195, last 5 lines and A196 lines
1-18 (Jacobsen’s DecoderPro) with A267 lines 8-42 (output from Katzer’s
software tool) (same order of data, and order, naming, and misspelling of
variables). See also A445, A450 (declaration of Alexander John Shepherd
describing how he found Katzer and KAMIND’s software tool, with
screenshot of software tool’s interface, showing JMRI input tab and KAM
output tab). Although required by JMRI’s license, Katzer and KAMIND did
not insert prominent notices in the files, stating how the files had been
changed. A370; A118; compare A188 (Jacobsen’s DecoderPro) with A205
(Katzer’s Decoder Commander); compare A188 (Jacobsen’s DecoderPro)
with A244 (output from Katzer’s software tool). They also did not comply
11
with other license requirements. See A370. Katzer and KAMIND then
distributed the infringing files with Decoder Commander and the software
tool. A115-A116. Katzer and KAMIND never told their customers that the
files Katzer and KAMIND gave them were restricted by a license. Katzer
and KAMIND also never told their customers that converting the JMRI
Decoder Definitions was contrary to the terms of the license. See A180
(reference to using software tool with “third party templates”). See generally
A151-A186 (Decoder Commander manual with no reference to JMRI license
or restrictions).
When Jacobsen discovered the copyright infringement, he sought to
enforce the copyright. Jacobsen obtained copyright assignments from JMRI
programmers and filed a copyright registration. A56. After obtaining the
copyright registration, Jacobsen amended his complaint and sued Katzer and
KAMIND for copyright infringement. Id.; A106; A357. In the district court,
Katzer and KAMIND claimed all older infringing versions of their software
have been disabled. A331-A332. They also maintained they quit using
JMRI Decoder Definitions with their products, and argued that they cannot
infringe because they are now using a database, which contains the same
decoder information. A332. However, Jacobsen showed the district court
12
that Katzer and KAMIND’s customers still can use previous versions of their
software. A359-A360. No later version of Katzer and KAMIND’s product
works so that Jacobsen could check whether all infringing files had been
removed. A360-A361. Furthermore, Katzer never explained how he could
re-create, nearly overnight, the work in his database that took about a dozen
JMRI programmers nearly 5 years to create. Other than conclusory
statements from Katzer, there is no proof that Katzer and KAMIND did not
use, and are not continuing to use, JMRI Decoder Definitions as a basis for
the information in their new database.
VI. Summary of Argument
The district court found a contract where none existed, broadly
interpreted the license contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent, and erroneously
denied Jacobsen’s motion for a preliminary injunction. On the likelihood of
success on the merits, the district court correctly found Jacobsen made a
prima facie case, but misconstrued the law, resulting in an incorrect
determination that Katzer and KAMIND’s activities were a breach of
contract instead of copyright infringement. In its ruling, the district court
found an agreement existed, although no evidence supports contract
formation with Katzer and KAMIND. The district court construed broadly
13
the license governing Jacobsen’s software, in contradiction to Ninth Circuit
precedent. The court failed to consider that the terms of the license were
conditions precedent to the grant of a license, or limited the scope of the
license. It also failed to consider that Katzer and KAMIND’s actions had
committed a material breach so significant that rescission was warranted.
The court incorrectly determined that Katzer and KAMIND had a license,
because Katzer and KAMIND never proved they had permission to use the
software in the manner that they did, and because Katzer and KAMIND acted
outside the scope of any implied license. Katzer and KAMIND, by their
actions, rejected the only license offered and thus, cannot rely on a unilateral
contract, or state they acted in the scope of a bare license. In the 
alternative,
the court failed to consider that any license Katzer and KAMIND had, had
been revoked. For these reasons, Jacobsen is likely to succeed on the merits.
Although irreparable harm is presumed, it is present because, as Katzer and
KAMIND have admitted elsewhere, damages may not be available to
Jacobsen. Thus, damages are inadequate. In the alternative, Jacobsen has
raised serious questions going to the merits, and has shown that the hardships
tip sharply in his favor. Jacobsen is not seeking destruction of Katzer and
KAMIND’s infringing software, but asks that the Court order them to comply
14
with the terms of the Artistic License if they copy, modify, or distribute JMRI
materials. Thus, this Court should reverse the district court’s decision and
order the preliminary injunction to issue.
VII. Standard of Review
While this case involves a patent, this appeal relates to copyright
infringement. When reviewing copyright matters, the Federal Circuit applies
the law of the regional circuit – here, the Ninth Circuit. Hutchins v. Zoll
Med. Corp., 492 F.3d 1377, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Ninth Circuit
reviews the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction for abuse of
discretion. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 713 (9th Cir.
2007); Taylor v. Westly, 488 F.3d 1197, 1199 (9th Cir. 2007). A district
court abuses its discretion if it bases its decision on an erroneous legal
standard or clearly erroneous findings of fact. Earth Island Inst. v. U.S.
Forest Serv., 442 F.3d 1147, 1156 (9th Cir. 2006). The Ninth Circuit reviews
district court’s findings of fact for clear error, and conclusions of law de
novo. Earth Island, 442 F.3d at 1156; Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 713.
VIII. Argument
Open source software is taking an increasingly important role in
business and society. Unlike traditional businesses, open source groups tend
15
to be a diffuse collection of programmers who may be located around the
world. Because of their informal and diffuse nature, open source groups are
vulnerable to theft of their intellectual property. That theft, in the form of
copyright infringement, happened in this case, and Jacobsen sought a
preliminary injunction to enjoin Katzer and KAMIND’s infringement.
In determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the Ninth
Circuit requires demonstration of (1) a combination of probability of success
and the possibility of irreparable harm; or (2) serious questions going to the
merits where the balance of hardships tips sharply in the moving party’s
favor. Dep’t of Parks & Recreation for the State of California v. Bazaar Del
Mundo Inc., 448 F.3d 1118, 1123 (9th Cir. 2006); Perfect 10, Inc. v.
Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 713-14 (9th Cir. 2007) (applying test in
copyright case); Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115,
1119 (9th Cir. 1999) (same). The two prongs represent two points on a
sliding scale rather than two separate tests, such that the required degree of
irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases. See
Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 714.
In cases involving copyright infringement claims, the inquiry is
circumscribed. In these cases, when a copyright holder has shown he is
16
likely to succeed on the merits of a copyright infringement claim, irreparable
harm is presumed. LGS Architects, Inc. v. Concordia Homes of Nev., 434
F.3d 1150, 1155-56 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v.
Moose Creek, Inc., 486 F.3d 629, 633 (9th Cir. 2007) (irreparable harm
presumed in trademark infringement case when trademark holder, seeking
preliminary injunction, shows likelihood of success on the merits). Here,
Jacobsen need only demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of his
copyright infringement claim to be entitled to injunctive relief. Similarly, if
there is a clear disparity in the relative hardships and they tip in Jacobsen’s
favor, Jacobsen need only demonstrate that serious questions are raised by
Katzer and KAMIND’s actions and its infringement of Jacobsen’s protected
copyright. Under this second test, Jacobsen need only demonstrate a fair
chance of success on the merits for an injunction to issue. Benda v. Grand
Lodge of Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 584 F.2d 308, 315
(9th Cir. 1978). Jacobsen is entitled to a preliminary injunction under either
variation of the test. Because the district court misconstrued the law,
Jacobsen can show a likelihood of success on the merits. Jacobsen can also
show the relative hardships tip in his favor. Thus, under either test, Jacobsen
is entitled to a preliminary injunction.
17
1. Jacobsen is Likely to Succeed on the Merits
a. Jacobsen Has Shown Copyright Infringement
Contrary to the district court’s finding, Jacobsen will likely succeed on
the merits of his copyright infringement claim. To make a prima facie case,
Jacobsen must show he is the owner or assignee of a copyright and that
Katzer and/or KAMIND have infringed one of the exclusive rights Jacobsen
has in his copyright. S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th
Cir. 1989). Although not addressing the matter directly, the district court
implicitly found that Jacobsen was the owner and assignee of the JMRI
Decoder Definitions 1.7.1. See A8 (district court refers to copyrighted
material as belonging to Jacobsen). The copyright registration shows
Jacobsen as owner and assignee. A94-A95. Katzer and KAMIND admit,
and the district court found, they downloaded the copyrighted files, stripped
out authors’ names and JMRI copyright notices, and converted the files to a
format they used with their competing product, Decoder Commander. A328;
see A9-A10. Thus Katzer and KAMIND admit copying, modifying and
distributing the copyrighted files. See id. Jacobsen has made a prima facie
case of copyright infringement. This left Katzer and KAMIND to raise a
defense that would defeat Jacobsen’s chances of success on the merits. They
18
raised the license defense, and the district court, in error, agreed that Katzer
and KAMIND’s license defense would succeed.
b. District Court Misconstrued the Law in Finding Katzer and
KAMIND had a License
In finding Katzer and KAMIND had a license, the district court
misconstrued the law and found that Katzer and KAMIND had a contract
where one did not exist. Contrary to Ninth Circuit precedent, the district
court also broadly interpreted the license and found that Katzer and
KAMIND’s activities were within the scope of the license.
The district court acknowledged that Jacobsen’s software was subject
to a license, the Artistic License. A10. “[I]mplicit in a nonexclusive license
is the promise not to use for copyright infringement. See In re CFLC, Inc.,
89 F.3d 673, 677 (9th Cir. 1996), citing De Forest Radio Telephone Co. v.
United States, 273 U.S. 236, 242 (1927)….” However, In re CFLC – cited to
the district court by Katzer and KAMIND – mentioned license and waiver
only briefly, and did not discuss that the waiver is only for activities within
the scope of the license. 89 F.3d at 677. In In re CFLC, a bankruptcy case
involving the disputed transfer of a patent license, the debtor sought to
transfer the license to an entity which bought substantially all the debtor’s
19
assets. Id. at 674-75. The patent licensor objected. Id. at 675. The Ninth
Circuit analyzed whether the license was an executory contract that would be
subject to the trustee’s power to transfer. Id. at 676-77. Because the licensee
had promised to pay, and the licensor had promised to waive the right to sue,
an executory contract existed and thus could be transferred. Id. at 677.
Invoking a narrow exception in the bankruptcy code, the Ninth Circuit
ultimately ruled that the license could not be transferred due to restrictions 
in
the license agreement. Id. at 676, 680. Nowhere in CFLC does the Ninth
Circuit discuss the scope of the waiver.
The district court then discussed the scope of the waiver, and
incorrectly found that Katzer and KAMIND’s copying, modification, and
distribution were in the scope of the Artistic License. “Based on … the
amended complaint and the explicit language of the JMRI Project’s artistic
license, the Court finds that [Jacobsen] has chosen to distribute his decoder
definition files by granting the public a nonexclusive license to use, 
distribute
and copy the files.” A10. In reaching its conclusion, the district court briefly
discussed S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989).
20
In S.O.S., the plaintiff held a copyright in a computer program
and had granted defendant a licence3 to “use” the software and
had explicitly reserved all other rights. The plaintiff claimed that
by modifying the software the defendant had exceeded the scope
of the license and therefore infringed the copyright.
A10. The district court did not discuss S.O.S. further, which is where the
district court made an error.
In its license agreement, S.O.S. had granted Payday a “right to use” a
series of programs that S.O.S. had created. 886 F.2d at 1083. S.O.S. had
retained all rights of ownership. Id. Two ex-S.O.S. employees colluded with
Payday to provide Payday with a copy of S.O.S.’s source code and convert it
to a new format for use on Payday’s machines. Id. at 1083-84. S.O.S.
brought suit for copyright infringement. Id. at 1084. The district court in
S.O.S. had interpreted the license agreement under the California rule that a
contract is construed against the drafter – S.O.S. Id. at 1088. The Ninth
Circuit held that interpretation was incorrect because the license was to be
interpreted narrowly. Id. at 1088. “[C]opyright licenses are assumed to
prohibit any use not authorized.” Id. Decisions in Ninth Circuit courts use
this rule. E.g., Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1988) (license to copy and distribute movies for showing on television did
3 As in district court opinion.
21
not include license to make and distribute VHS tapes of the movies, since
VCRs had not been created at the time the license was granted); Apple
Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(Walker, J.) (“[T]he Ninth Circuit has directed district courts to interpret
copyright licenses narrowly, consistent with federal copyright policy of
providing incentives in the form of copyright protection to authors.”)
Like the district court in S.O.S., the district court in Jacobsen
interpreted the license broadly, in contradiction to federal copyright policy
and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in S.O.S. and Cohen. Here, the district court
ruled, “The license explicitly gives the users of the material, any member of
the public, ‘the right to use and distribute the [material] in a more-or-less
customary fashion, plus the right to make reasonable accommodations4.’ […]
The scope of the nonexclusive license is, therefore, intentionally broad.”
A11. However, the Artistic License permits use only within the bounds of
the license grant. The district court analyzed one phrase, “You may
otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way” – and stopped. A9-
A11. The Artistic License continues further: “provided that you insert a
4 As in district court opinion. The correct word is “modifications”.
22
prominent notice in each changed file stating how and when you changed that
file, and provided that you do at least ONE of the following:…” A370. The
district court did not consider that the license grant relating to making
derivative works, may be narrowed by conditions directly related to the
license grant, or interpretation.
The district court also implied, incorrectly, that Jacobsen, and Katzer
and KAMIND, had a contract. “…[Jacobsen] may have a claim against
[Katzer and KAMIND] for breach [of]5 the nonexclusive license agreement,
but perhaps not a claim sounding in copyright.” A10 (emphasis added).
Katzer and KAMIND never produced any signed agreement between
themselves and Jacobsen. Katzer and KAMIND never showed that Jacobsen
specifically created JMRI software for them, nor they had Jacobsen’s consent
to use the software in the manner that they did. Katzer and KAMIND never
showed acceptance through performance, as required by a unilateral contract.
Thus, the district court had no basis for finding an agreement existed.
The district court also did not properly consider other problems with
Katzer and KAMIND’s license defense – specifically, Katzer and KAMIND
5 “of” is not present in the opinion.
23
had not met conditions precedent, Jacobsen had revoked Katzer and
KAMIND’s license, and Jacobsen was entitled to rescission of any contract
Katzer and KAMIND had. In denying Jacobsen’s motion for leave to file a
motion for reconsideration, the district court stated it had considered these
arguments and found them unpersuasive. A13.
Had the district court properly construed the law, it would have found
Katzer and KAMIND’s license defense fails, as shown next.
c. Katzer and KAMIND’s License Defense Fails
Katzer and KAMIND can raise no defense to defeat their copyright
infringement liability. An accused infringer escapes liability if he acted
within the scope of a license, and that license revocation is not available and
rescission is unwarranted. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188
F.3d 1115, 1121 (9th Cir. 1999); Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586
(9th Cir. 1993). The accused infringer has the burden of proving the
existence of a license. See Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics,
Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 1999). A license can be either an
implied non-exclusive license, typically through a contract or other
transaction with the copyright holder, or a bare license, a permission
describing what a user can do with copyrighted material. Sun Microsystems,
24
188 F.3d at 1121; Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir.
1990); I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 775 (7th Cir. 1996); Lowe v. Loud
Records, No. Civ.A. 01-1797, 2003 WL 22799698, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 20,
2003). There is no such thing as an implied nonexclusive license to the
world. “An implied license requires more than a general intent of the author
regarding the disposition of his work. As with any other license, the terms –
including the identity of the licensee – should be reasonably clear.” David
Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright § 10.03[A][7] [hereinafter “Nimmer on
Copyright”]; Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, Inc.,
227 F.3d 1110, 1114-15 (9th Cir. 2000) (while author intended his work to
have the widest audience possible, no evidence suggested that he created it
specifically for dissemination by third parties, and thus no implied license
existed)6. Thus, any “license to the world” must be a bare license.
6 In Worldwide Church of God, an author had created a work that the church
distributed for free in its magazine. 227 F.3d at 1113. The author, who intended
the work to reach large audiences, bequeathed his work to Worldwide Church of
God. See id. After he died, Worldwide Church of God withdrew the work from
circulation. Id. Philadelphia Church of God taught from the work and required 
its
parishioners to read the work prior to baptism into the church. Id. When
25
Katzer and KAMIND cannot show either an implied license or a bare
license. Katzer and KAMIND cannot show an implied license arising from a
bilateral contract. No evidence exists that shows a transaction between
Worldwide Church of God withdrew the work, Philadelphia Church of God made
copies. Id. Worldwide Church of God sued, and Philadelphia Church of God
raised a license defense, but after it filed its answer. Id. at 1113-14. The 
Ninth
Circuit dismissed Philadelphia Church of God’s arguments that it had a license
because the church had not raised the defense in its answer. Id. at 1114. In 
dicta,
the Ninth Circuit stated that the Philadelphia Church of God’s arguments
nonetheless had no merit because “[i]t has offered no evidence that Armstrong
created [the work] for dissemination by third parties, much less that he 
intended to
license [Philadelphia Church of God] to reprint the entire book and use it for 
its
own church.” Id. at 1114-15.
While this isolated dicta can be read to suggest an open source license is an
implied license, Jacobsen believes that the better view is to consider the 
license a
bare license. As Nimmer states, in an implied license, the terms including the
identity of the licensee should be reasonably clear. A bare license can be a
permission given to the general public. Either way, the result would be the same
because, among other reasons, Katzer and KAMIND did not act within the scope
of the license grant.
26
Jacobsen, and Katzer and KAMIND. In the unlikely event a bilateral
contract is found, a contract governing the use of JMRI Decoder Definitions
1.7.1 has several conditions. These conditions, directed at how a user may
copy, modify, and distribute the copyrighted files, must be met prior to any
license grant. Furthermore, any modifications must be within the license
grant – and thus, reasonable, per the license preamble – and Katzer and
KAMIND’s modifications were not. Even if a contract is found, it will fail
because of failure of consideration, or no meeting of the minds. If a contract
was formed, the contract should be rescinded because of Katzer and
KAMIND’s total and bad faith failure to perform. Katzer and KAMIND do
not have a unilateral contract because, by their own actions, they cannot show
acceptance by performance when they never performed. Through their
actions, they rejected the only license offered and thus rejected the
obligations, rights and benefits of that license. No other grounds for an
implied nonexclusive license – consent or lack of objection – exist. A bare
license defines the scope of the license grant. Katzer and KAMIND’s actions
were outside the scope of a bare license. If Katzer and KAMIND had a
license, Jacobsen has revoked it and thus the cause of action lies in copyright.
Although the Artistic License is either a unilateral contract or a bare license,
27
Jacobsen begins by discussing an implied license arising from a bilateral
contract since Katzer and KAMIND cited case law involving bilateral
contracts to suggest they had an implied license.
i. Katzer and KAMIND Cannot Show They Had an Implied
Nonexclusive License from Jacobsen
As a preliminary matter, Katzer and KAMIND cannot prove they had
an implied nonexclusive license from Jacobsen. The existence of a license is
an affirmative defense which Katzer and KAMIND must prove. See
Augustine Med., Inc. v. Progressive Dynamics, Inc., 194 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 1999). A nonexclusive license may be granted orally or by
conduct. Effects Assoc., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555, 558 (9th Cir. 1990) .
A nonexclusive license is often implied when parties enter into a contract.
See, e.g., I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768, 776-77 (7th Cir. 1996)
(architect who created drawings for a joint venture for a fee, also granted
implied nonexclusive license to joint venture).
ii. No Bilateral Contract Exists Between the Parties
Although Katzer and KAMIND argued in the district court they had an
implied license arising from a bilateral contract, they did not. A bilateral
contract forms when two parties exchange promises to do something they
28
otherwise are not obliged to do. Cal. Civ. §§ 1549, 1550, 1605; Schaeffer v.
Williams, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1243, 1246 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). The parties
then perform their promises to carry out the contract. See Cal Civ. § 1657.
All cases Katzer and KAMIND relied upon in the district court to argue that
their infringement was a state law breach of contract action – all involve
bilateral contracts. Sun Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d
1115 (9th Cir. 1999) (negotiated contract); Polar Bear Prods., Inc. v. Timex
Corp., 384 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2004) (negotiated contract); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996) (shrink-wrap license is a
contract); S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081 (9th Cir. 1989)
(negotiated contract). However, Katzer and KAMIND didn’t have a bilateral
contract. They never negotiated with Jacobsen for use of the Decoder
Definition Files. A115. A click-through or shrink-wrap license may form a
contract. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450-53 (7th Cir. 1996)
(shrink-wrap license is a contract under Wisconsin law); see also Wall Data
Inc. v. Los Angeles Sheriff’s Dept., 447 F.3d 769, 775 n.5 (9th Cir. 2006)
(describing click-through agreements). But here, there was no shrink-wrap
license or click-through license for anyone to see and accept. A356. Here,
Jacobsen places the Decoder Definition Files for others to download. Id.
29
Users go to “mirror” site for the download, save the download to their hard
drives, click on the executable once it downloads, and then the download
installs. Id. Thus, no bilateral contract ever formed.
Aside from no evidence of Katzer and KAMIND’s acceptance,
numerous other problems with contract formation exist. Because they appear
to believe their performance was optional, there is no evidence they paid
consideration, a necessary element of a contract. Cal. Civ. § 1550. A
contract would also fail because there was no meeting of the minds as to the
subject matter of the contract. Beard v. Goodrich, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1031,
1039-40 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003); Cal. Civ. § 1580. Consumers would believe
the performance which they offered through use of the software tool meets
the license requirements, but it does not.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the parties formed a bilateral
contract, still no implied license protects Katzer and KAMIND and their
actions nonetheless were infringement. If a party has not met a condition
precedent to the grant of the license, yet he exercises one of the exclusive
rights, he infringes the copyright. Rano v. Sipa Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586
(9th Cir. 1993). Also, if a party’s actions lie outside the scope of the license
grant, he infringes the copyright. Id. Finally, if a party’s actions breached
30
the contract in a material and substantial manner, the copyright holder is
entitled to rescind the contract. Id. Cf. Storage Tech. Corp. v. Custom
Hardware Eng’g & Consulting, 421 F.3d 1307, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(discussing infringement in the context of actions exercising an exclusive
right but which are outside the license grant, and not discussing conditions
precedent or rescission). As noted earlier, in accordance with federal policy,
copyright licenses must be construed narrowly such that “copyright licenses
are assumed to prohibit any use not authorized.” S.O.S., Inc v. Payday, Inc.,
886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989). E.g., S.O.S., 886 F.2d at 1088-1089
(reversing district court which applied California rule to interpret license
against drafter); Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 853-854
(9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting license permitting exhibition on television to
exclude exhibition by means of a video cassette recorder); Allegro Corp. v.
Only New Age Music, Inc., No. Civ-01-790-HU, 2003 WL 23571745, at *9
(D. Or. Jan. 23, 2003) (interpreting modifications of master recordings not
described in license agreement as outside scope of license); Apple Computer,
Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 759 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (N.D. Cal. 1991)
(construing license permitting visual displays of Microsoft applications to
31
exclude visual displays created by calls from those applications to Macintosh
operating system).
Katzer and KAMIND’s use of JMRI files did not meet the conditions
of the license grant. Users may copy, distribute or modify the JMRI files
subject to conditions in the Artistic License. In the Preamble of the Artistic
License, it states: “The intent of this document is to state the conditions 
under
which a Package may be copied….” Relating to modifications:
3. You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any
way, provided that you insert a prominent notice in each changed
file stating how and when you changed that file, and provided
that you do at least ONE of the following…
A370 (emphasis added). The Preamble expresses that there are conditions
which a user of the files must meet when gaining the permissions listed in the
Artistic License. If the conditions are not met, then the user does not have
permission to use JMRI’s Decoder Definitions. Furthermore, the word
“provided” in Sec. 3 expresses that Katzer and KAMIND’s right to make
modifications vests only upon performance of the condition – it “is one of the
apt words commonly used to create a condition.” See City of Stockton v.
Weber, 98 Cal. 433, 440 (1893). See also 11 Williston on Contracts § 30.10
(4th ed. 1999) (Richard A. Long, ed.) (“provided” interpreted as “upon
32
condition”). As noted in Apple Computer, both the S.O.S. and Cohen
decisions support a narrow construction of the license terms to require
performance of the condition, to limit the scope of the license grant to
activities which it permits, and to protect the copyright owner’s rights. 759
F. Supp. at 1451. The copyright holder/licensor would find it difficult if not
impossible to enforce the license if “provided” were not read as a condition.
Furthermore, in some instances, only one or two terms stand between the
copyright holder and a would-be licensee. One frequent term is preservation
of the copyright notice. Construing “provided that” as a condition is in line
with federal copyright policy because it gives notice of the copyright holder’s
rights, and makes it easier for the copyright holder to enforce his copyright.
In the alternative, Katzer and KAMIND’s copying, modification, and
distribution were outside the scope of the license grant.7 Here, conditions
discussed previously act as restrictions. Because the restrictions on the
license relate to the exclusive rights under copyright law, these restrictions
7 In copyright disputes involving bilateral contracts, courts distinguish 
between
independent contractual covenants, and conditions, to determine whether a
violation of a contract term is a breach of contract, or copyright 
infringement. Sun
Microsystems, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 188 F.3d 1115, 1122 (9th Cir. 1999).
33
narrow the scope of the license grant. See Sun Microsystems, Inc. v.
Microsoft Corp., 81 F. Supp. 2d 1026, 1031 (N.D. Cal. 2000). The district
court characterized Jacobsen’s claim as seeking an attribution right, but
properly viewed, Jacobsen’s claim is for infringement of his exclusive right
to make derivative works. The district court analyzed one phrase, “You may
otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way” – and stopped. A9-
A11. As noted earlier, the district court did not consider that this license
grant may be narrowed by conditions directly related to the license grant, or
interpretation. Furthermore, the Preamble of the Artistic License states:
“…the Copyright Holder maintains some semblance of artistic control over
the development of the package, while giving the users of the package … the
right to make reasonable modifications.” A370. Proper interpretation of the
phrase “You may otherwise modify your copy of this Package in any way”
results in an interpretation that any modifications of JMRI software must be
reasonable – that is, within the scope defined by the restrictions on the
exclusive rights. Katzer and KAMIND’s modifications – the conversion of
the files without regard to the restrictions in the Artistic License – were not
reasonable. Katzer and KAMIND exceeded the scope of any license grant
34
they can prove they had, and infringed Jacobsen’s copyright. Rano v. Sipa
Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586 (9th Cir. 1993).
Finally, the contract should be rescinded because of Katzer and
KAMIND’s own willful, material breach of the license terms. “A breach of a
licensing agreement will justify rescission of a licensing agreement only
when it is of so material and substantial a nature that it affects the very
essence of the contract and serves to defeat the object of the parties. The
breach must constitute a total failure in the performance of the contract.”
Rano v. Sipo Press, Inc., 987 F.2d 580, 586 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotations and
citations removed). The bargain in open source licensing is that the terms of
the licensing agreement be followed. Given Katzer’s complete failure to
follow any license terms, rescission is warranted, and thus Katzer and
KAMIND are liable for copyright infringement. Katzer learned of this
rescission – he suddenly changed his products to remove nearly all the
infringing files. But he continued to infringe and encouraged others to
infringe. Thus, the copyright claim may stand.
iii. No Other Implied License Exists
Katzer and KAMIND also do not have an implied nonexclusive license
from Jacobsen under any other theory. “An implied nonexclusive license has
35
been granted when (1) a person (the licensee) requests the creation of a work,
(2) the creator (the licensor) makes that particular work and delivers it to the
licensee who requested it, and (3) the licensor intends that the 
licenseerequestor
copy and distribute his work.” I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d 768,
776 (7th Cir. 1996) (citing Effects Assoc., 908 F.2d at 558-59). This
definition is widely accepted. E.g., Kennedy v. Nat’l Juvenile Detention
Ass’n, 187 F.3d 690, 694 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing rule from I.A.E.); Lulirama
Ltd. v. Axcess Broadcast Servs., Inc., 128 F.3d 872, 879 (5th Cir. 1997)
(same).
Here, there is no evidence that Katzer nor any KAMIND employee
contacted Jacobsen to request creation of the Decoder Definition Files.
A115. Jacobsen and the JMRI open source group did not make the Decoder
Definition files for Defendants. Id. Jacobsen did not specifically intend
Katzer or KAMIND to distribute the Decoder Definition files. Id. Thus,
Jacobsen did not grant a license to Defendants.
The I.A.E. Court also held that consent in the form of mere permission
or lack of objection is also equivalent to an implied nonexclusive license.
I.A.E., 74 F.3d at 775. Neither Katzer nor any KAMIND employee sought or
received permission from Jacobsen to make derivative works from the
36
Decoder Definition Files. A115. Neither Katzer nor any KAMIND
employee told Jacobsen that they were using the Decoder Definition Files to
create decoder templates, so that he could object to that use. Id. In fact,
Katzer and KAMIND cannot argue that they had permission. Katzer and
Jacobsen discussed the terms of the Artistic License related to modifications.
A292-A293. Jacobsen corrected a misconception Katzer had about the
license and produced in his email response the terms related to modifications.
Id. Thus, Katzer knew about the license and its terms. Furthermore, the
purpose of open source is make software freely available – but with
restrictions. These restrictions often are preservation of a copyright notice
and a requirement that changes made to the software are also made freely
available. E.g., Lawrence Rosen, Open Source Licensing: Software Freedom
and Intellectual Property Law 316 (BSD license), 319 (MIT license), 320
(Apache license), 322-23 (Apache contributor license agreement), 330-33
(GNU General Public License) (2005). Katzer knew generally about open
source. A292-A293. Katzer and KAMIND had to know that using the
Decoder Definition Files as they did would be highly objectionable to
Jacobsen and others at JMRI, as it would be generally to those in open
source. So Katzer and KAMIND knew they did not have permission.
37
If the Court finds an implied license, Katzer and KAMIND acted
outside the scope of the license for the reasons stated above.
Should the Court find that Defendants initially had permission to use
the files per the license, Jacobsen later revoked permission to use JMRI files.
A license unsupported by consideration may be revoked. Nimmer on
Copyright § 10.02[B][5]; Avtec Sys., Inc. v. Peiffer, 21 F.3d 568, 574 n.12
(4th Cir. 1994). Here, Katzer learned that Jacobsen was investigating
Defendants’ products, and knew he had been caught infringing the
copyrighted materials. See A357. Katzer quickly removed nearly all
infringing derivative works from his Decoder Commander product, but still
made the tool available, and distributed a new version of his product. A331,
A357-A358. Katzer thus knew the permission, if it is ever existed, had been
revoked, or would soon be revoked. After Jacobsen filed the Amended
Complaint, charging Katzer with copyright infringement, there is no question
that Jacobsen had revoked any permissions Katzer and KAMIND had, and
Katzer and KAMIND knew it. See Rest. 2d Contracts § 43 (“An offeree's
power of acceptance is terminated when the offeror takes definite action
inconsistent with an intention to enter into the proposed contract and the
offeree acquires reliable information to that effect.”). See also Palmer v.
38
Schindler Elevator Corp., 108 Cal. App. 4th 154, 159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).
Finally, Jacobsen sent a cease and desist letter to Katzer and KAMIND that
indicated they were engaging in infringing conduct. A315-A317. Katzer and
KAMIND never responded to the letter. Once permission has been revoked,
continued usage makes the user an infringer. I.A.E., Inc. v. Shaver, 74 F.3d
768, 775 & n.10 (7th Cir. 1996). Katzer and KAMIND continued to infringe.
Thus, they are liable for copyright infringement. The district court erred in
rejecting this argument.
iv. No Unilateral Contract Exists
Assuming for the sake of argument that the district court interpreted the
Artistic License was a unilateral contract, a contract never formed because
Katzer and KAMIND never accepted the offer in the Artistic License. A
unilateral contract can be accepted only through performance. See
Neisendorf v. Levi Strauss & Co., 143 Cal. App. 4th 509, 523-24 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2006) (discussing employment benefit that never became due because
employee did not accept through performance). Because of this, the
condition/covenant distinction, important in bilateral contracts, does not 
exist.
Anyone seeking to accept the contract through performance, must tender all
the required performance. Rest. 2d Contracts § 59; see Neisendorf, 143 Cal.
39
App. 4th at 524. “Where an offer invites an offeree to accept by rendering a
performance [only]…, an option contract is created when the offeree tenders
or begins the invited performance o
-------

regards,
alexander.

--
"Plaintiffs’ copyrights are unique and valuable property whose market
value is impossible to assess"

                             -- SOFTWARE FREEDOM LAW CENTER, INC.


reply via email to

[Prev in Thread] Current Thread [Next in Thread]