branch master updated: gnu: glibc: Fix CVE-2023-4911.

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     new 1328c4cca5 gnu: glibc: Fix CVE-2023-4911.
1328c4cca5 is described below

commit 1328c4cca531318e3ed90c6aecb522a5b22a4bcc
Author: Liliana Marie Prikler <liliana.prikler@gmail.com>
AuthorDate: Wed Oct 4 21:27:13 2023 +0200

    gnu: glibc: Fix CVE-2023-4911.
    
    * gnu/packages/patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch: New file.
    * gnu/local.mk: Register it here.
    * gnu/packages/base.scm (glibc/fixed): New variable.
    (glibc): Use it as replacement.
---
 gnu/local.mk                                       |   1 +
 gnu/packages/base.scm                              |  10 ++
 .../patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch         | 160 +++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 171 insertions(+)

diff --git a/gnu/local.mk b/gnu/local.mk
index 9fa52833cb..13c2b94944 100644
--- a/gnu/local.mk
+++ b/gnu/local.mk
@@ -1284,6 +1284,7 @@ dist_patch_DATA =                                         
\
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2019-7309.patch               \
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2019-9169.patch               \
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-CVE-2019-19126.patch              \
+  %D%/packages/patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch  \
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-allow-kernel-2.6.32.patch         \
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-boot-2.16.0.patch                 \
   %D%/packages/patches/glibc-boot-2.2.5.patch                  \
diff --git a/gnu/packages/base.scm b/gnu/packages/base.scm
index c0813f7de0..2d8e9143cd 100644
--- a/gnu/packages/base.scm
+++ b/gnu/packages/base.scm
@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ the store.")
   (package
    (name "glibc")
    (version "2.35")
+   (replacement glibc/fixed)
    (source (origin
             (method url-fetch)
             (uri (string-append "mirror://gnu/glibc/glibc-" version ".tar.xz"))
@@ -1062,6 +1063,15 @@ with the Linux kernel.")
    (license lgpl2.0+)
    (home-page "https://www.gnu.org/software/libc/";)))
 
+(define glibc/fixed
+  (package
+    (inherit glibc)
+    (source
+     (origin (inherit (package-source glibc))
+             (patches
+              (append (search-patches "glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch")
+                      (origin-patches (package-source glibc))))))))
+
 ;; Define a variation of glibc which uses the default /etc/ld.so.cache, useful
 ;; in FHS containers.
 (define-public glibc-for-fhs
diff --git a/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch 
b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..d8044f064d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/gnu/packages/patches/glibc-2.35-CVE-2023-4911.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,160 @@
+From 1056e5b4c3f2d90ed2b4a55f96add28da2f4c8fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 18:39:32 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] tunables: Terminate if end of input is reached
+ (CVE-2023-4911)
+
+The string parsing routine may end up writing beyond bounds of tunestr
+if the input tunable string is malformed, of the form name=name=val.
+This gets processed twice, first as name=name=val and next as name=val,
+resulting in tunestr being name=name=val:name=val, thus overflowing
+tunestr.
+
+Terminate the parsing loop at the first instance itself so that tunestr
+does not overflow.
+
+This also fixes up tst-env-setuid-tunables to actually handle failures
+correct and add new tests to validate the fix for this CVE.
+
+Signed-off-by: Siddhesh Poyarekar <siddhesh@sourceware.org>
+Reviewed-by: Carlos O'Donell <carlos@redhat.com>
+---
+Backported to 2.35 by Liliana Marie Prikler <liliana.prikler@gmail.com>
+
+ NEWS                          |  5 +++++
+ elf/dl-tunables.c             | 17 +++++++++-------
+ elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
+ 3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+Index: glibc-2.35/NEWS
+===================================================================
+--- glibc-2.35.orig/NEWS
++++ glibc-2.35/NEWS
+@@ -199,6 +199,11 @@ Security related changes:
+   corresponds to the / directory through an unprivileged mount
+   namespace.  Reported by Qualys.
+ 
++  CVE-2023-4911: If a tunable of the form NAME=NAME=VAL is passed in the
++  environment of a setuid program and NAME is valid, it may result in a
++  buffer overflow, which could be exploited to achieve escalated
++  privileges.  This flaw was introduced in glibc 2.34.
++
+ The following bugs are resolved with this release:
+ 
+   [12889] nptl: Race condition in pthread_kill
+Index: glibc-2.35/elf/dl-tunables.c
+===================================================================
+--- glibc-2.35.orig/elf/dl-tunables.c
++++ glibc-2.35/elf/dl-tunables.c
+@@ -187,11 +187,7 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *val
+       /* If we reach the end of the string before getting a valid name-value
+        pair, bail out.  */
+       if (p[len] == '\0')
+-      {
+-        if (__libc_enable_secure)
+-          tunestr[off] = '\0';
+-        return;
+-      }
++      break;
+ 
+       /* We did not find a valid name-value pair before encountering the
+        colon.  */
+@@ -251,9 +247,16 @@ parse_tunables (char *tunestr, char *val
+           }
+       }
+ 
+-      if (p[len] != '\0')
+-      p += len + 1;
++      /* We reached the end while processing the tunable string.  */
++      if (p[len] == '\0')
++      break;
++
++      p += len + 1;
+     }
++
++  /* Terminate tunestr before we leave.  */
++  if (__libc_enable_secure)
++    tunestr[off] = '\0';
+ }
+ #endif
+ 
+Index: glibc-2.35/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+===================================================================
+--- glibc-2.35.orig/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
++++ glibc-2.35/elf/tst-env-setuid-tunables.c
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ const char *teststrings[] =
+   
"glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.not_valid.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "not_valid.malloc.check=2:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.check=2",
+   
"glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096:glibc.malloc.check=2",
+   
"glibc.malloc.check=4:glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.maoc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   ":glibc.malloc.garbage=2:glibc.malloc.check=1",
+@@ -70,6 +72,8 @@ const char *resultstrings[] =
+   "glibc.malloc.perturb=0x800:glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
+   "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=glibc.malloc.mmap_threshold=4096",
++  "",
+   "",
+   "",
+   "",
+@@ -89,6 +93,8 @@ test_child (int off)
+ 
+   if (val != NULL)
+     printf ("[%d] Unexpected GLIBC_TUNABLES VALUE %s\n", off, val);
++  else
++    printf ("[%d] GLIBC_TUNABLES environment variable absent\n", off);
+ 
+   return 1;
+ #else
+@@ -117,21 +123,26 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+       if (ret != 0)
+       exit (1);
+ 
+-      exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
++      /* Special return code to make sure that the child executed all the way
++       through.  */
++      exit (42);
+     }
+   else
+     {
+-      int ret = 0;
+-
+       /* Spawn tests.  */
+       for (int i = 0; i < array_length (teststrings); i++)
+       {
+         char buf[INT_BUFSIZE_BOUND (int)];
+ 
+-        printf ("Spawned test for %s (%d)\n", teststrings[i], i);
++        printf ("[%d] Spawned test for %s\n", i, teststrings[i]);
+         snprintf (buf, sizeof (buf), "%d\n", i);
++        fflush (stdout);
+         if (setenv ("GLIBC_TUNABLES", teststrings[i], 1) != 0)
+-          exit (1);
++          {
++            printf ("    [%d] Failed to set GLIBC_TUNABLES: %m", i);
++            support_record_failure ();
++            continue;
++          }
+ 
+         int status = support_capture_subprogram_self_sgid (buf);
+ 
+@@ -139,9 +150,14 @@ do_test (int argc, char **argv)
+         if (WEXITSTATUS (status) == EXIT_UNSUPPORTED)
+           return EXIT_UNSUPPORTED;
+ 
+-        ret |= status;
++        if (WEXITSTATUS (status) != 42)
++          {
++            printf ("    [%d] child failed with status %d\n", i,
++                    WEXITSTATUS (status));
++            support_record_failure ();
++          }
+       }
+-      return ret;
++      return 0;
+     }
+ }
+