Re: [GNU/consensus] Eccentric Authentication again

[Guido Witmond]

On 09/06/13 17:28, hellekin wrote:
> On 09/05/2013 06:02 PM, Guido Witmond wrote:
>>>
>>> Can you explain/point me to a resource where those steps (to 
>>> avoid the mitm attack) are described?
>>>
> 
>> That would be in the manual of the voice/video/chat package. 
>> Usually it means validating a SAS (Short Authentication String) 
>> once.
> 
> *** You mean, beforehand, out of band? Doesn't it defeat the purpose
> of authenticating strangers?

Authenticating the SAS is part of the document where you do the
opposite: authenticating relatives after exchanging the keys via an
insecure channel.

You're right that it doesn't work for authenticating strangers. That's
the topic of the second part of the blog where I introduce my ideas on it.


> The MITM attack scenario nowadays seems quite... Normal.
> 
> I mean, who trusts the X509 infrastructure after the Snowden
> Apocalypse? I thought the security model was "My node is secure.
> Everything else is compromised." And even that does not seem to be
> certain, so we *assume* our node not to be compromised.

Nope, the model has always been that the end users' node is insecure.
That's why everyone limits http-sessions with banks. They even forbid
people from letting their browser remember passwords.

To solve that, take a look at capability operating systems such as
genode.org. More necessary than ever.

Guido.

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