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Re: The SHA1 sunset
From: |
Lars Magne Ingebrigtsen |
Subject: |
Re: The SHA1 sunset |
Date: |
Mon, 04 Jan 2016 23:14:06 +0100 |
User-agent: |
Gnus/5.130014 (Ma Gnus v0.14) Emacs/25.1.50 (gnu/linux) |
Mike Gerwitz <address@hidden> writes:
> The date that browsers implement warnings is arbitrary; this is still
> certainly "a thing".
>
> https://sites.google.com/site/itstheshappening/
I'm not sure why you're linking to that site?
The question isn't whether the NSA are able to do SHA-1 collisions
(which I think everybody assumes that they can, albeit expensively), but
whether they can create certificates. The jury is out on that one, and
many people think that it's not a thing (yet) (with certificates with
the recommended entropy in serial numbers and dates).
https://blog.cloudflare.com/why-its-harder-to-forge-a-sha-1-certificate-than-it-is-to-find-a-sha-1-collision/
> Such a warning will not be bogus, and it would be a service to warn
> users even if others don't.
It will almost certainly be bogus (now). Next year, perhaps not.
--
(domestic pets only, the antidote for overdose, milk.)
bloggy blog: http://lars.ingebrigtsen.no
Re: The SHA1 sunset, James Cloos, 2016/01/04