[Gnu-arch-users] Re: [OT] flame-fest

[Tom Lord]

    > From: "Stephen J. Turnbull" <address@hidden>

    > In particular, you say you believe we agreed that:

    >     Tom> All but one of the software freedoms (access to source)
    >     Tom> exist until they are specifically restricted by
    >     Tom> copyright, contract, or similar constructions of the
    >     Tom> state, deployed by individuals.

No, I didn't say I believe we agree to that.  I said that we agreed to
walk through some of the arguments step by step.

In particular, I wrote:

  I have many beliefs and thoughts in that area, of course, and many
  reasons for them.  I outlined some of them for you in broad strokes
  and when confusion seemed to result, offered to walk you through
  some of the arguments carefully, step by step.  You initially
  agreed.

  All but one of the software freedoms (access to source) exist [....]

I think it quite syntactically clear in that that "You initially
agreed," refers to other material in that same paragraph, not the
following one.

However -- That you would disagree with such a simple proposition is
quite surprising:


    > I do not agree, and never did.  If I appeared to do so, it was
    > because I didn't realize that you link physical lack of
    > encumbrance to the social phenomenon of freedom as closely as
    > you do, while I see a clear distinction.  This is precisely what
    > I wanted to discuss.

Gee, my deskside dictionary offers as the third definition of
"freedom" the phrase "Ease of movement".   I wasn't aware that this
was a controversial usage.

I grant you that freedom is in some important respects a social
phenomenon above and beyond the construction of law.   But in this
context we are discussing "software freedoms" -- a concept
specifically defined in relationship to the law.   Other than through
specific legal constructions, how are the software freedoms (other
than access to source) ever in legal doubt?

Along those general lines, and hopefully not too much of a digression, 
two observations about the founders of the United States (Madison and
Jefferson especially) strike me as interesting and relevent:

a) They believed that copyright is _entirely_ a construction of the
   state (indeed, the early history of the concept comes in the form
   of decrees from sovereign monarchs).  Jefferson argued briefly for
   its abolition in the new republic and Madison argued not for its
   essential nature but for its utility to the people.  Indirectly, we
   see evidence that its being established as a federal power was, as
   much as anything, a concession to the pragmatic concern that
   various states would implement incompatible copyright regimens.

b) Isn't it interesting that they didn't conclude "Hey, we don't need
   copyright -- you can do the same thing via contracts.   If Joe
   wants to print a book, can't he contractually obligate his 
   customers not to permit copying?"   They didn't reach that
   conclusion because they felt it necessary to construct a legal
   restriction not just of Joe's customers, but of everyone.  Absent
   the explicit construction of a federal power to establish such a
   legal power, there would be little-to-no basis for such a
   restriction in this "the power of the state derives from the 
   people" state.



Important distinctions may be made between the broad word "freedom"
and the range of acts which are physically unobstructed but not
explicitly prohibited by law -- but I'm interested to hear which
specific distinctions you think are relevent to a discussion of
software freedoms which are, fundamentally, a concept about the
application of the law.

-t