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[Gnu-arch-users] Re: [OT] flame-fest


From: Tom Lord
Subject: [Gnu-arch-users] Re: [OT] flame-fest
Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2003 12:13:44 -0800 (PST)


    > From: "Stephen J. Turnbull" <address@hidden>

    > I don't feel your [responses in the ethics threads] have been
    > responsive, either. 

I'm not sure I can help you but let's review:

My understanding was that you wanted to understand some of what I
believe about the ethics of software freedoms, and why.  This all
started with your "why the `ourage'" question.

I have many beliefs and thoughts in that area, of course, and many
reasons for them.  I outlined some of them for you in broad strokes
and when confusion seemed to result, offered to walk you through some
of the arguments carefully, step by step.  You initially agreed.

All but one of the software freedoms (access to source) exist until
they are specifically restricted by copyright, contract, or similar
constructions of the state, deployed by individuals. {please see
notes: "technological restriction", "access to source considered
separately"}

As individuals and collectively, we make the _choices_ which shape and
deploy those contructions of the state.  We participate in democratic
processes that define the parameters of copyright.  We offer, accept,
or decline particular contracts.  And so forth.

Choices of substance are the subject of ethics.  If we are going to
think clearly about the ethics of software freedoms, we must think
about the nature of those choices.  We will have to consider what good
and what ill comes from making them in one way rather than another in
order to better know how to make those choices morally.

That's almost as far as I got while speaking with you -- you cut off
discussion shortly after that.  

I was, in fact, going to proceed from there to make an argument for
what we might call "the strong form of software freedoms" -- to argue
that not only is it better for individuals to choose to use free
software licenses, but in fact that it is better for the state to
permit no other kind.

I didn't get the chance to make that argument but I did begin to
describe the problem such an argument would have to address:

    T> There are, of course, varying theories about the nature of a
    T> state's interest in enforcing contract but regardless of
    T> which theory you believe in, the decision of what to enforce
    T> and what not to is inextricably a matter of public
    T> policy.

    T> And there are, of course, varying theories about the best
    T> form of construction for monopolies granted to authors and
    T> inventors -- but again, that question is a matter of public
    T> policy.

And since we had agreed to step through the argument a little bit at a
time, I paused:

    T> Are you with me so far?

You first replied with:

    S> No.

    S> (1) We're not talking about my "right to contract", except as
    S> an example of an issue affected by alleged software freedoms,
    S> effects which I personally find exceptionally unjustifiable.
    S> Since you are obsessed with it to the point of being unable to
    S> discuss anything else, let's forget about there being a "right"
    S> to contract. 

So in your "open minded" inquiry into my beliefs, in response to a
_preface_ to the argument, you've replied that (a) you believe that no
such argument can possibly be made ("exceptionally unjustifiable") and
(b) so let's not even talk about it ("let's forget about there being a
`right to contract'".)

Around the same time, I started a _different_thread_ about the
possibility of constructing a "right of attribution" as a sufficient
"exclusive right" (in the US-Constitutional sense) to construct
economic incentive for authors and inventors.  I think that it's an
interesting idea partly because, if it works, it will resolve the
tension between the incentives of artists and inventors and the
freedoms of the public to copy, distribute, modify and use the works
of those artists.  While in one thread I might argue that it is the
greater ill to restrict those freedoms, in this second thread, I
thought it would be interesting to explore some new economic
alternatives to systems that rely on such restrictions -- to find a
positive alternative to the greater ill.

I CC'ed you on that because you have said (have you not?) that the
idea of free software appeals to you in some ways -- and here was an
opportunity to use your professional skills help advance that idea.

You replied by accusing me:

    S> Ah, well done!  Rather than respond to another thread by defining
    S> software freedom in ethical terms, you've written a document in
    S> political economy where you [...]

That "rather than" speaks volumes to me about your approach to our 
discussions.  You finished with:

    S> Continuing is evidently pointless.  So ... let's call it a
    S> draw, and concentrate on arch (or Pika), instead.

    S> Anway, I'm out of this thread, and all the related [OT]
    S> threads.

The preceeding exchange, starting with your "No,", is what I was
talking about when I said:

    T> For example, when I begin to explain a particular set of
    T> arguments about how software freedoms relate to copyright and
    T> contracts, he unilaterally declares the topic of copyright and
    T> contracts irrelevent

You quoted those very words and replied:

    > But that _was_ responsive to the fact that you were failing to
    > address my arguments.  You asserted that enforcement of licenses
    > requires "fascism".  OK, yes, invasion of privacy is a problem
    > if one insists on an _absolute_ right to _enforceable_ contract.
    > We fenced about the definition of contract, and I stopped
    > contesting your definition (ie, including state enforcement)
    > after a bit.  Then I pointed out that licenses like the AFPL
    > require the same degree of enforcement as the GNU GPL, and you
    > ignored that.  I suggested that if there were a right to
    > contract enforcement, it might be limited by the right to
    > privacy, and thus not lead to "fascism".  You ignored that, too.

You have accused me of failing to address your arguments.  Let's look
at this carefully because, yes, I have accused you of arguing sloppily
and distortively and here you've given an example.

Let's go back and look at the context of your arguments about facism
in the overall discussion:

These threads go pretty far back.   The topic of of facism came up
around 11 Nov, thusly:

    S> When the strongest direct argument you can come up with for
    S> your right to copy is "Nyaah, nyaah, nyaah, you can't stop me",

    T> I did indeed endorse the "natural rights argument" which seems
    T> to be what you refer to.  The argument is not simply "you can't
    T> stop me from copying software": it's a bit more sophisticated
    T> than that.  The argument is that to make prohibition of copying
    T> _enforcable_ by the excutive and judiciary, one would have to
    T> create an unreasonably intrusive state ("a facist state" in
    T> traditional hacker speak).  I do think it outrageous if you
    T> want to do business in a way that will require facism to
    T> enforce your contracts.

You replied:

    S> Example: You say enforcement leads to "fascism."  Nonsense.
    S> True, the "nyaah, nyaah, nyaah" argument combined with the
    S> right to privacy makes it impossible (at first glance, anyway)
    S> to prevent copying and modification without "fascism", but
    S> there's nothing "fascist" about enforcing a voluntary contract
    S> that says "I won't advertise copies for sale."  Or, if we
    S> accept rms as an authority on the boundary of privacy, then a
    S> contract which imposes conditions on redistribution between
    S> individuals is legitimate; the GPL does that.

Now I happen to think that there are several flaws with your reply,
but it is quite true that I didn't respond to it directly (yet).  In
that same reply and others around that time, you made many, many
statements that I didn't reply directly to.  It seemed to me that
_most_ of your replies missed the mark -- that we appeared to be
talking past one another.  It seemed to me that, for example, if you
had better understood what I was talking about, that you wouldn't
think that comparing the GPL's restrictions on redistribution were a
relevent comparison.

In other words, your response to my use of the word "facism" wasn't an
isolated point that I could reply to -- there were too many similar
points in your message and it seemed to me that a back-and-forth
point-by-point on each of those would only further degrade an already
unsuccessful attempt at communication.

And that led directly to our agreement to step through some of my
arguments -- arguments in response to your original question about
"why the outrage" -- carefully and in small increments:

    S> I apologize for my bad temper.

    S> But it's fish-slap time. [....]

    T> Um, I had a little trouble getting much out of your next ~100
    T> lines, which I would like to presume is just a communication
    T> snafu, so let's take this one step at a time, shall we?
    T> "Stepping through in a debugger", so to speak.

We began that process.  We initially settled that my paraphrase of
your original question was objectionable to you.  We agreed to reframe
the discussion in such a way as to not need to form such a paraphrase:


    S>     Tom> Ok, then.  I'll turn it around (still in debugger mode
    S>     Tom> -- one step at a time).

    S> I like this metaphor!

    S>     Tom> Part of what offends me about the the BK license is
    S>     Tom> very general: that it is a _contractual_offer_, and
    S>     Tom> specifically an offer that asks users to give up their
    S>     Tom> software freedoms

    S> (gdb) step

    S> They're not giving up "their software freedoms" in the sense
    S> that we usually think of freedom, when we're talking about
    S> fundamental rights.  They're giving up the right to do certain
    S> things with a certain program, certain things that they could
    S> not do anyway until they acquire the program.  When you accept
    S> Holmes's stricture that you may not scream "Fire!" in a crowded
    S> theater, have you given up your freedom of speech?  Of course
    S> not!  When you insist that it is right to prohibit proprietary
    S> licenses, do you mean to strip me of my right of contract?  Of
    S> course not!---you simply intend to restrict it in a way you
    S> think is socially desirable.

And I replied to that, not even taking issue with anything you said:

    T> Your "right to contract" is not some a priori element of nature
    T> -- some personal liberty granted by a creative force -- which
    T> can be modified only by constructing restrictions.  On the
    T> contrary, your "right to contract" exists _only_ as social
    T> construction, at least insofar as _enforcement_ is fundamental
    T> to contract.  (Your "right to gentlemen's agreement", being not
    T> based on enforcement, is a different matter.)

    T> All but one of the GPL software freedoms (to run, copy, modify,
    T> and distribute -- but not to obtain source), in contrast, _are_
    T> a priori elements of nature.  They are personal liberties, like
    T> speech or association, that truly can only be modified by a
    T> constructed restriction (whether voluntary, like a contract, or
    T> mandatory, like a copyright, patent, or trademark law).  The
    T> restrictions on those freedoms exist only insofar as society as
    T> a whole is willing to back them with enforcement.

    T> There are, of course, varying theories about the nature of a
    T> state's interest in enforcing contract but regardless of which
    T> theory you believe in, the decision of what to enforce and what
    T> not to is inextricably a matter of public policy. 

and that brings us full circle.  You should recognize that last
paragraph because I quoted it earlier in this message to.

Let's not lose our place here.  Earlier in this message we began to
consider:

   S> But that _was_ responsive to the fact that you were failing to
   S> address my arguments.  You asserted that enforcement of licenses
   S> requires "fascism".  [....]

and I replied:

   T> You have accused me of failing to address your arguments.  Let's
   T> look at this carefully because, yes, I have accused you of
   T> arguing sloppily and distortively and here you've given an
   T> example.

and what do we see by looking at it carefully?  That your argument
about facism was part of a cluster of arguments that seemed to me
indicate a miscommunication between us.  That in response to that
cluster, I suggested walking through a review of what I was saying "in
debugger mode" and you agreed.  That after putting aside the question
of how to paraphrase your old question about "outrage", I simply
mentioned the fairly obvious way in which the ethics argument I would
be making related to the powers of the state.  And now, in effect, you
say that by your refusing to participate in a discussion about the
powers of the state you are being "responsive" to my supposedly not
replying to your objection to the use of the word "facism".

To sum it up more succinctly:  _while_I_was_replying_ to (among
others) your arguments about facism, you (a) ruled out discussion
about the powers of the state;  (b) accused me of being non-responsive
by even mentioning the powers of the state.   Accordingly to you, it
seems, we are to have a discussion of facism in which one may not
mention the powers of the state.



    > I saw no way forward.  So I returned to my primary interest,
    > which was a positive argument for software freedom, other than
    > the "open source movement" style.  Perhaps that was a strategic
    > mistake, closing more doors to communication than it could
    > possibly open, but I'm as frustrated by your failure to engage
    > in careful critical reasoning as you are by mine.

Perhaps the problem is simply that you are too impatient and hasty in
your replies.   As in the example of the "facism" discussion -- you
seem to simply lose your place.



    >     Tom> [Abandoning an argument which has reached impasse and setting
    >     Tom> up straw men is] not the totality of his underhanded
    >     Tom> rhetorical tactics, but it's a good example.

    > It's a pretty weak example of "underhanded" rhetorical tactics.
    > Everything I wrote was public, and explicit enough to be directly
    > refuted.

Having agreed to step through a discussion bit by bit, you got to the
first step, declared the topic off limits, posted a great volume of
"arguments" that were, again, quite wide of anything I was saying, and
basically just rambled for a while.   Yes, much of what you said could
be directly refuted, much of it contains kernels of truth, little of
it had anything to do with the alleged flow of the conversation, and
that is why I described it as "shouting down" rather than discussion.


    > On the other hand, _here's_ something that, if intentional, is very
    > underhanded:

    >     S> But what does that have to do with my workplace?  If one is
    >     S> aware of one's ignorance about the working of society, and of
    >     S> ethical policy, and wishes to learn, what happier place to work
    >     S> than one devoted (at least in name) to the study of policy and
    >     S> social planning?

    >     Tom> I have not seen evidence that Stephen "wishes to learn".

    > Since I had just clearly implied that I wish to learn, you are
    > asserting that I lied.  

Or are confused.

    > After all, if my _deliberate_ implication (and it was clear to
    > you, because you chose to respond to it) is not evidence that I
    > wish to learn, it must be a lie.

or consfusion.

    > But of course your plausible deniability is preserved, because the
    > syntactic form of your statement is not an assertion that I lied.

I'm not sure whether you did or not.  Your "pen w/ infinite ink"
comments do seem to me to draw into question your motives.


    >     Tom> I have seen evidence that, intentionally or not,

    > And there you go again.  The word "intentionally" clearly implies
    > ill-intent on my part, but by grammatically making it an arm of a
    > disjunction, you can deny that you asserted it.

No, I asserted that there is ambiguity on the matter and, by
implication, that the resolution of that ambiguity is a question worth
considering.


    > I think it is rather unlikely that you are doing this accidently.  The
    > syntax "I have seen evidence" is unnatural, especially since you fail
    > to present _any_ evidence.  

Now I have.

    > And somebody who was seeking "careful critical reasoning" at
    > this point would challenge me by asserting (perceived) ill-will
    > on my part, and say "if you don't stop doing X, I'll have to
    > conclude you're doing it on purpose."  Like this:

    > Tom, please stop making assertions about my ill-will in implicit,
    > "plausibly deniable" form.  If you continue to do so, I will have to
    > conclude it is intentional slander.

You are a bit of a puzzle to me, Stephen.  On the one hand, looking at
your web site, and your technical contributions here, and various
other things -- you seem a capable guy.  On the other hand, in these
threads with me, you seem to abandon the flow of discussion and go off
in quite strange and obfuscating directions.

I mean neither to assert that you have ill-will nor to hide behind a
shield of "plausible deniability".  I believe that whether or not you
have ill-will in this context has become a reasonable question and I
did mean to raise it -- but not to assert a conclusion.

In the preceding, I have described the flow of the discussion as it
appears to me.   It looks as if you asked for conversation about a
topic X, then ruled X out of the discussion, then accused me of not
responding to your request for conversation about X.

These threads have, indeed, become a large text.  I've little doubt
that few people are following them with care in any kind of detail at
this time.  What I'm trying to call your attention to is that _you_
are showing scant evidence of trying to follow them with care in any
kind of detail -- and that is disappointing, puzzling, frustrating,
seemingly uncharacteristic of you, and thus does raise in my mind
questions about your motive.

-t

notes:

{technological restriction}:

  "All but one of the software freedoms (access to source) exist until
   they are specifically restricted by copyright, contract, or similar
   constructions of the state, deployed by individuals."

  Since at least the early 1980s come people have tried to restrict
  software freedoms through various mechanisms of "copy protection".
  While initially such mechanisms exploited only divergence between
  the physical capabilities of manufacturer-supplied copying software
  from those of floppy-disk drives and their controllers, more
  recently there has been some thinking, design effort, and deployment
  to build copy protection into the design of hardware.

  Accompanying those efforts have been (disappointingly successful) 
  legislative efforts to accomplish in law what can not be
  accomplished in hardware.

  Thus, software freedoms are also under attack from a superficially
  new direction: by attempts to lead hardware manufacturers into
  producing devices which can (when shored up by laws) eliminate those
  freedoms (if the products of those manufacturer's dominate the
  marketplace).

  The arguments I intended to make for "strong form software freedoms"
  were not going to directly address such efforts -- though they
  also deserve consideration.   Should such laws exist?  Should their
  opposite?  Is it ethical for hardware manufacturers to agree to 
  participate in such an agenda?   Should their be organized
  resistence among prospective consumers?




{access to source considered separately}:

  "All but one of the software freedoms (access to source) exist until
   they are specifically restricted by copyright, contract, or similar
   constructions of the state, deployed by individuals."

  If I have access to a stream of bits which are some binary copy of a
  program you have given me, and even the most basic hardware
  resources, then there is nothing to prevent me making a copy or even
  giving it to someone else other than the law.   This is a profound
  shift in circumstance characteristic of the digital age contrasted
  with the age of Gutenberg.

  But nothing in my stream-of-bits binary-distribution gives me
  similar "natural" freedom with respect to obtaining the source
  code.  

  The GPL puts forth the idea that, given that stream of bits, and
  within reasonable pragmatic constraints, I ought to have the right
  to demand and receive from you the source code form that produced
  those bits.   

  Such a right to source is of an entirely different nature from a
  right to, for example, copy: while my freedom to copy exists by
  circumstance and imposes no natural imposition on you, my freedom to
  obtain source imposes on you a burden of action -- a compulsion -- a
  legal and enforcable obligation.

  Thus, the right of access to source differs from the other software
  freedoms in their relationship to enforcement by the state:  while
  the right of access to source calls for the state to compel you to
  action, the other software freedoms restrict you from invoking the
  state to compel me to not copy software.

  It's not _quite_ a black and white line.   The GPL does not sanction
  _arbitrary_ copying (e.g., it does not sanction copying that omits
  the copyright and license) -- but it does "pull back", limit, reduce
  the cases in which enforcement by the state may be invoked.

  In contrast to so-called "proprietary licenses" [*], the right to
  source increases the power of the state to limit (some) freedoms;
  while the other software freedoms reduce the power of the state.

  [*] "so-called ``proprietary licenses''" because, really, the GPL
  is no less ``proprietary'' -- the distinction is really more about 
  the ontological question of what "property" consists of in these 
  virtual realms.






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