Re: secure boot

[Josselin Poiret]

Hi Antonio,

Antonio Carlos Padoan Junior <acpadoanjr@yahoo.com.br> writes:

> Can we imagine signing the kernel outside the guix layer, I mean,
> directly into the store without using guix commands? I understand this
> would break conceptually the Guix functional characterization, and it is
> not very "clean". But despite these points, any other side effects expected?

This subject has been discussed a bit in the past.  My opinion on what
you're suggesting is that:
* We should not modify the store in place.  This is bound to create problems
for the user, because we'd be breaking the Guix guarantees.

* You could sign it out of the store.  Basically, something like `sign
/gnu/store/xxxxxx-bzImage > /boot/bzImage_signed`.  However, this poses
problems with generations, since either we prohibit loading older
generations, which is a huge step backwards, or we sign all of the older
generations as well, which will take a non-negligible amount of space.
In that case, we'd also need to keep track of the different signed
kernels that are sitting in /boot to be able to clean them up when the
generations are deleted.

It's not an easy problem unfortunately, and the number of people whose
threat model requires such a thing is slim, hence the lack of work in
that direction.

Best,
-- 
Josselin Poiret