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Re: DRM vs. Privacy


From: Marcus Brinkmann
Subject: Re: DRM vs. Privacy
Date: Mon, 07 Nov 2005 21:01:14 +0100
User-agent: Wanderlust/2.14.0 (Africa) SEMI/1.14.6 (Maruoka) FLIM/1.14.7 (Sanjō) APEL/10.6 Emacs/21.4 (i386-pc-linux-gnu) MULE/5.0 (SAKAKI)

Jonathan,

I think we have all become so accustomed to computers where the
superuser can do _everything_ that we have forgotten what privacy is
in the context of multi-user computer systems.

Can you give some references on this topic?  I think we have a pretty
good idea now how privacy can be implemented and verified using
confinement and TC, but here are a couple of issues that at least I
could need some more pointers to:

* What is the impact of not having the privacy requirements you want
  to have?  One recent case I can think of is viruses that send random
  files to random people in your address book.  What else is there?

* More specifically: No popular system today provides this amount of
  privacy.  Why is this currently not widely perceived as a problem?
  (This is another way of asking: Why are current systems not good
  enough?)

* What are the legal consequences of implementing or not implementing
  this feature?  In a system where the sysadmin can edit the content
  of the machine, he may be liable.  In a system where every change
  can be (presumably) traced to me, _I_ am liable.  How can I proof
  that the machine was compromised if there is a strong scientific
  argument that the machine is "safe"?

  For completeness: If we build such a system, and it turns out to
  _not_ be safe, are we programmers liable?  Certainly we can't afford
  to carry such a liability as free software hackers writing in our
  spare time.

* How do we know that we really achieve privacy?  If the
  FBI/NSA/CIA/etc can install a cryptographic backdoor in TPM/TCPA
  chips, it can probably replace the OS without revealing this
  modification in the remote attestation protocol.  Isn't it better to
  openly not have privacy than to believe to have privacy without
  actually having it?

  Also, what happens if the FBI/NSA/CIA/etc does this, then uses my
  account to attack some machines, and then sues me?  (Ie, a
  combination of the last two points).

Some of this is of course speculative.  But at least the first
questions are questions for present facts, and don't involve any big
brother paranoia whatsoever.

Thanks,
Marcus






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