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[RFC PATCH v4 36/36] docs: Add TDX documentation
From: |
Xiaoyao Li |
Subject: |
[RFC PATCH v4 36/36] docs: Add TDX documentation |
Date: |
Thu, 12 May 2022 11:18:03 +0800 |
Add docs/system/i386/tdx.rst for TDX support, and add tdx in
confidential-guest-support.rst
Signed-off-by: Xiaoyao Li <xiaoyao.li@intel.com>
---
docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst | 1 +
docs/system/i386/tdx.rst | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++
docs/system/target-i386.rst | 1 +
3 files changed, 105 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 docs/system/i386/tdx.rst
diff --git a/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst
b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst
index 0c490dbda2b7..66129fbab64c 100644
--- a/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst
+++ b/docs/system/confidential-guest-support.rst
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ Supported mechanisms
Currently supported confidential guest mechanisms are:
* AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) (see
:doc:`i386/amd-memory-encryption`)
+* Intel Trust Domain Extension (TDX) (see :doc:`i386/tdx`)
* POWER Protected Execution Facility (PEF) (see
:ref:`power-papr-protected-execution-facility-pef`)
* s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) (see :doc:`s390x/protvirt`)
diff --git a/docs/system/i386/tdx.rst b/docs/system/i386/tdx.rst
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..96d91fea5516
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/system/i386/tdx.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+Intel Trusted Domain eXtension (TDX)
+====================================
+
+Intel Trusted Domain eXtensions (TDX) refers to an Intel technology that
extends
+Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) and Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME)
+with a new kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain (TD). A TD runs
+in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of its memory
+contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the hosting
+Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself.
+
+Prerequisites
+-------------
+
+To run TD, the physical machine needs to have TDX module loaded and initialized
+while KVM hypervisor has TDX support and has TDX enabled. If those requirements
+are met, the ``KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES`` will report the support of
``KVM_X86_TDX_VM``.
+
+Trust Domain Virtual Firmware (TDVF)
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+Trust Domain Virtual Firmware (TDVF) is required to provide TD services to boot
+TD Guest OS. TDVF needs to be copied to guest private memory and measured
before
+a TD boots.
+
+The VM scope ``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides command
``KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION``
+to copy the TDVF image to TD's private memory space.
+
+Since TDX doesn't support readonly memslot, TDVF cannot be mapped as pflash
+device and it actually works as RAM. "-bios" option is chosen to load TDVF.
+
+OVMF is the opensource firmware that implements the TDVF support. Thus the
+command line to specify and load TDVF is `-bios OVMF.fd`
+
+Feature Control
+---------------
+
+Unlike non-TDX VM, the CPU features (enumerated by CPU or MSR) of a TD is not
+under full control of VMM. VMM can only configure part of features of a TD on
+``KVM_TDX_INIT_VM`` command of VM scope ``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl.
+
+The configurable features have three types:
+
+- Attributes:
+ - PKS (bit 30) controls whether Supervisor Protection Keys is exposed to TD,
+ which determines related CPUID bit and CR4 bit;
+ - PERFMON (bit 63) controls whether PMU is exposed to TD.
+
+- XSAVE related features (XFAM):
+ XFAM is a 64b mask, which has the same format as XCR0 or IA32_XSS MSR. It
+ determines the set of extended features available for use by the guest TD.
+
+- CPUID features:
+ Only some bits of some CPUID leaves are directly configurable by VMM.
+
+What features can be configured is reported via TDX capabilities.
+
+TDX capabilities
+~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
+
+The VM scope ``MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP`` ioctl provides command
``KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES``
+to get the TDX capabilities from KVM. It returns a data structure of
+``struct kvm_tdx_capabilites``, which tells the supported configuration of
+attributes, XFAM and CPUIDs.
+
+Launching a TD (TDX VM)
+-----------------------
+
+To launch a TDX guest:
+
+.. parsed-literal::
+
+ |qemu_system_x86| \\
+ -machine ...,confidential-guest-support=tdx0 \\
+ -object tdx-guest,id=tdx0 \\
+ -bios OVMF.fd \\
+
+Debugging
+---------
+
+Bit 0 of TD attributes, is DEBUG bit, which decides if the TD runs in off-TD
+debug mode. When in off-TD debug mode, TD's VCPU state and private memory are
+accessible via given SEAMCALLs. This requires KVM to expose APIs to invoke
those
+SEAMCALLs and resonponding QEMU change.
+
+It's targeted as future work.
+
+restrictions
+------------
+
+ - No readonly support for private memory;
+
+ - No SMM support: SMM support requires manipulating the guset register states
+ which is not allowed;
+
+Live Migration
+--------------
+
+TODO
+
+References
+----------
+
+- `TDX Homepage
<https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/intel-trust-domain-extensions.html>`__
diff --git a/docs/system/target-i386.rst b/docs/system/target-i386.rst
index 96bf54889a82..16dd4f1a8c80 100644
--- a/docs/system/target-i386.rst
+++ b/docs/system/target-i386.rst
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ Architectural features
i386/kvm-pv
i386/sgx
i386/amd-memory-encryption
+ i386/tdx
.. _pcsys_005freq:
--
2.27.0
- Re: [RFC PATCH v4 26/36] i386/tdx: Finalize TDX VM, (continued)
- [RFC PATCH v4 28/36] i386/tdx: Disable PIC for TDX VMs, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 33/36] i386/tdx: Only configure MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV in kvm_init_msrs() for TDs, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 35/36] i386/tdx: Don't get/put guest state for TDX VMs, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 32/36] i386/tdx: Don't synchronize guest tsc for TDs, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 34/36] i386/tdx: Skip kvm_put_apicbase() for TDs, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 31/36] hw/i386: add option to forcibly report edge trigger in acpi tables, Xiaoyao Li, 2022/05/11
- [RFC PATCH v4 36/36] docs: Add TDX documentation,
Xiaoyao Li <=