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Re: [Gnu-arch-users] {arch} perms -> shared revlib?


From: John Meinel
Subject: Re: [Gnu-arch-users] {arch} perms -> shared revlib?
Date: Thu, 23 Sep 2004 19:03:49 -0500
User-agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 0.8 (Windows/20040913)

Zenaan Harkness wrote:
[...]

That is excellent information! Thank you very much!

I have a little question, after having done the above (rm temporaries +
blow away old revlib, and "tla get $archat" to repopulate the revlib):

___ 04-09-24 09:43:00 address@hidden:~ $ lal \
revlib/address@hidden/cpc/cpc--stable/cpc--stable--1.0/cpc--stable--1.0--patch-5/\{arch\}/
total 24
-rw-rw-r--    1 arch     arch           50 Sep 24 09:42
++default-version
drwxr-xr-x    2 arch     arch         4096 Sep 24 09:42 ,,inode-sigs/
-rw-rw-r--    1 arch     arch           52 Sep 24 09:42
.arch-project-tree
-rwxrwxr-x    1 arch     arch         6809 Sep 24 09:42 =tagging-method*
drwxrwxr-x    5 arch     arch         4096 Sep 24 09:42 cpc/


and as you will note, ,,inode-sids _in the revlib_,
is not group writable. It's the only file like this in the revlib.

Is this a problem for my shared revlib?

If so, can it be fixed?

thanks again
zenaan


Well, from my knowledge this shouldn't be a problem. ,,inode-sigs is not supposed to ever change. It is basically like a hash checksum of the files in the revlib to make sure they haven't changed. (it is actually some group of timestamp, inode number, file size, ....)

I'm pretty sure if it is created in that location, it isn't meant to change, so you shouldn't need write access. You might run into problems if someone needs to clean up the revlib, and doesn't have access.

Of course, the *proof* is to run 2 clients under different users and see if you have problems :)

let us know what you find.


[off-topic about inode-sigs]

I know *why* arch keeps a pretty stringent check on it's pristines/revlib. A corrupt pristine/revlib would generate bogus changesets, etc.

But I know we've had problem with the specific incantation of ,,inode-sigs.

I was just wondering if we could do a 2-tiered approach. Have some sort of inode-sig that might change without corruption, but is very fast to evaluate. This should also *always* find a change no false negatives. (Such as ctime (or maybe mtime)). Then also include a md5hash. So if the first *fast* one says the file changed, you could check the second one to verify, and then if it didn't change, you just update the inode-sig to the newly correct value.

We didn't use md5sums because hashing the whole tree is slow. But if we just hash things that seem to have changed, wouldn't that be fast?

Also, if the current inode-sig only uses information from a single stat, I don't think we can out-perform it time wise. So there may be no benefit. Just something I was thinking about.

John
=:->

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