Re: Physical access without ultimate power? (was Re: Design principles and ethics (was [...])))

[Jonathan S. Shapiro]

On Mon, 2006-05-01 at 09:11 +0200, Bas Wijnen wrote:
> On Mon, May 01, 2006 at 12:29:30AM -0400, Jonathan S. Shapiro wrote:
> > Pierre is correct. You can reinstall. You can even turn the chip off
> > *without* reinstalling (when you turn it on again it will reinitialize).
> 
> Of course you can simply install a new system.  I was speaking of "upgrading"
> and "bug fixing".  This is not possible, because it will effectively be
> "reinstalling" in that you lose all your data (assuming the default was to
> protect it).

It is of course possible that MS will make a mistake in this regard, but
it is perfectly clear how to execute the upgrade within the protocol of
the TCPA hardware.

I agree, however, that MS can only get this wrong once. Ever.

> So you don't lose the power to destroy your operating system, but you do lose
> the power to change it.

This is far too strong. What you lose -- *if* you *choose* to turn the
TCPA hardware on -- is the ability to change those portions of your
operating system that implement the security contract.

shap