Re: Physical access without ultimate power? (was Re: Design principles and ethics (was [...])))

[Pierre THIERRY]

Scribit Bas Wijnen dies 30/04/2006 hora 22:50:
> > The problem was: if you cannot verify this, you cannot rely on this.
> You can if you are the machine owner, which is usual for systems with
> really sensitive data.

We are precisely talking about having sensitive data on a system owned
by someone else...

> And you can trust the machine owner of a different computer to not use
> this information.

Some sensitive data is just incompatible with trust. I won't bring my
secret OpenPGP keyring at my work, but that forces me to connect to my
home system to send mail. If I could check that noone will be able to
read my secret key when it is in my session, I would happily bring it at
work.

> With this chip, it's possible to verify it technically, but this
> results among other things in the fact that the machine owner can no
> longer upgrade his machine in case a bug is found in the critical
> parts.

Are you sure this statement is true? Isn't it just that as long as the
new system is not given a certification, it won't be able to access data
encrypted with the previous one?

Doubtfully,
Nowhere man
-- 
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OpenPGP 0xD9D50D8A

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