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Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs
From: |
Espen Skoglund |
Subject: |
Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs |
Date: |
Mon, 2 Jun 2003 22:44:00 +0200 |
[Marcus Brinkmann]
> For DoS attack examination, one also has to take into account that
> what you say is an exceptional event can be provoked by the client
> reliably. So one has to ensure that even the exceptional even does
> not have any negative impact on the server in an asymmetric trust
> model.
Sure. For the particular case we have been discussing---i.e., the
server specifies a zero xfer timeout---only the client itself will
suffer from provoking such exceptions.
eSk
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, (continued)
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Niels Möller, 2003/06/03
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Kip Macy, 2003/06/06
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Niels Möller, 2003/06/02
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Marcus Brinkmann, 2003/06/02
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Jean-Charles Salzeber, 2003/06/02
- Re: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Marcus Brinkmann, 2003/06/02
- RE: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Volkmar Uhlig, 2003/06/02
RE: Vulnerabilities in Synchronous IPC Designs, Volkmar Uhlig, 2003/06/02