Re: [Sks-devel] SKS should not accept or replay non-exportable certifications

[Phil Pennock]

On 2013-09-14 at 20:46 -0500, John Clizbe wrote:
> 2) JimBob lsigns his own key, creating a non-exportable selfsig then delsigs
> all of the exportable selfsigs.  This is shooting oneself in the foot. If we
> honor no-export on a selfsig, we create keys with UIDs that have no binding
> signature. THIS IS VERY VERY BAD. I think the RFC folks should probably have
> been more explicit on this case, but to be fair, it's probably a use case they
> did not anticipate.

I can see a use for this.  If I'm creating a PGP-using role service,
managed by several people, where the key needs to be online in the role
account, I might want to avoid letting the service's own PGP key be
something that others can import and provide signatures for.  It's
explicitly a service which can be set to trust other keys, but should
not be trusted by other people.

That key would probably have some lsigns on a few PGP keys belonging to
the people who administer the service.

It's a decent way to declare that a key should not appear in public
keyrings such as those in keyservers, while still being able to *use*
PGP and automatically maintain trust paths.

I do *not* think that it is censorship for a keyserver to honour an
attribute of a signature, where the attribute is covered by the
signature.  If a signature is marked 'local', honouring its own conveyed
wishes is not censorship, it's discretion.

-Phil

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